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Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects 
By George W Dent, ]1: * 
What do business lawyers do? To that seemingly simple question there has been no good 
answer. For twenty-five years, the most widely accepted explanation was that offered by 
Professor Ronald Gilson in his article, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills 
and Asset Pricing, in the Yale Law JournaL Examining the work of lawyers in large 
mergers and acquisitions, Professor Gilson concluded that business lawyers are transaction 
cost engineers. On that basis, he proposed sweeping changes for the training of business 
lawyers in law schools. 
However, mergers and acquisitions are but one of many tasks handled by business law-
yers, and their role in other contexts is quite different. Moreover, the work of business law-
yers has changed considerably since 1984. This Article offers a broader and more current 
analysis of what business lawyers do and concludes that they are more accurately character-
ized as enterplise architects. The Article then discusses what skills business lawyers need and 
how law schools can best prepare them for this worh. 
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In 1984 Ronald Gilson published Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal 
Skills and Asset Pricing. It began: "What do business lawyers really do? Embar-
rassingly enough, at a time when lawyers are criticized with increasing frequency 
as nonproductive actors in the economy, there seems to be no coherent answer." 1 
He dismissed lawyers' own answer that "they 'protect' their clients, that they 
get their clients the 'best' deal."2 He also rejected the academic literature which 
offered a laundry list of roles the business lawyer plays: "a counselor, planner, 
drafter, negotiator, investigator, lobbyist, scapegoat, champion, and, most strik-
ingly, even ... a friend. "3 
While conceding that this list "rings true enough,"4 he held it deficient because 
"[i] f what a business lawyer does has value, a transaction must be worth more, net 
L Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pridng, 94 YALE LJ. 
239, 241 (1984) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
2. !d. at 242. 
3. !d. 
4. !d. at 243. 
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of legal fees, as a result of the lawyer's participation. "5 That is, lawyers must not 
perform mere "distributive bargaining, in which the size of the pie is by definition 
fixed," but rather "joint problem solving in which, through cooperation, the size 
of the pie, and hence the size of the piece received by each party, can be increased. "6 
He rejected prior analyses because they failed to explain "precisely how do the 
activities of business lawyers affect transaction value. "7 "[I]f all a business lawyer 
offers is skill in distributive bargaining, the clients' joint decis1on would be to hire 
no lawyers at all .... "8 
Dissecting the corporate acquisition as his specimen,9 Gilson concluded that 
lawyers add value as "transaction cost engineers. "10 In particular, lawyers bridge 
the parties' divergent expectations about returns on the asset to be transferred 
by drafting an earnout which makes the price contingent on its returns between 
the signing of the deal and the closing, and overcome lack of information (prin-
cipally of the buyer) by arranging efficient production and verification of infor-
mation.11 From these findings, Gilson also recommended that legal education for 
business practice downgrade traditional subjects (like analysis of appellate cases 
and knowledge of relevant regulatory law) in favor of corporate finance and trans-
action cost economics. 12 
In the succeeding twenty-five years, Gilson and others refined his thesis, but 
no one fundamentally challenged it. This literature about what corporate law-
yers do (the "received model") is too narrow. This Article takes a wider and 
deeper perspective. Part I describes the received model. Part II exposes several 
problems with that model. Part Ill offers a fuller vision showing that business 
lawyers perform a greater range of activities using a larger set of skills than in 
the received model. Although these activities and skills are extremely varied, 
it is less accurate to say that business lawyers are transaction cost engineers 
than that they are enterprise architects. Part IV discusses the implications of 
this revised model for legal education. It argues that, although a knowledge of 
corporate finance and transaction cost economics is useful for some business 
lawyers, it is more important that business lawyers understand the obstacles to 
optimizing the performance of business entities and the contractual mechanisms 
available to overcome these obstacles. They also need specific behavioral skills, 
including how to negotiate when all parties are trying to build mutual trust and 
confidence. 
5. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
6. Id. at 245 n.9 (emphasis added). 
7. Id. at 243. Elaborating, Gilson adds that the question is not whether each party separately is bet-
ter off with a lawyer. Rather, the transaction should be "viewed from the perspective of both clients .... 
[T]he appropriate perspective is not that of the client with the more talented lawyer, but the joint 
perspective of both clients." Id. at 245. 
8. Id. at 245. 
9. Id. at 256. 
10. Id. at 255. 
11. See id. at 262-93. 
12. Id. at 305. 
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I. THE RECEIVED MoDEL 
But for a few small errors Gilson!> original article is accurate as far as it goes. Its 
main problem is that it focuses on lawyers in large acquisitions, a highly specialized 
practice involving one phase of one-shot, arm!>-length transactions. This practice 
lies at one end of a continuum of business law practice that ranges across repeat 
transactions and relational contracts to internal transactions and non-transactional 
practice. 13 Large acquisitions are not at all typical of most business lawyers' prac-
tice. Like the blind men touching the elephant, Gilson mistook a small part for the 
whole. 14 Subsequent scholarship has improved only slightly on his original thesis. 
A. GILSON's ORIGINAL THESIS 
Again, Gilson claims business lawyers create value by reducing transaction 
costs. Government regulation is one source of transaction costs, but Gilson says 
"the regulatory justification for business lawyers ... simply does not get us far 
enough."15 Much that lawyers do in acquisitions does not concern regulation. 
Therefore, he analyzes the largely "standardized" corporate acquisition agreement, 
showing how lawyers lower costs. 16 For one, they bridge the parties' divergent 
expectations about the future risk and return of the asset to be transferred by draft-
ing an earnout which makes the price contingent on the return from the asset 
over some period before the closing. 17 Since the seller will control the asset during 
that period, part of the lawyers' task here is "devising a transaction structure that 
constrains the seller!> ability to maximize the value of the business over a period 
different from that relevant to the buyer."18 
Gilson then considers the costs of information, which lawyers reduce by iden-
tifying the party best able to produce information and to what extent (if any) and 
by whom the accuracy of information should be warranted. 19 However, he finds 
a flaw in current practice: 
What remains puzzling, however, is the apparent failure by both business lawyers 
and clients to recognize that the negotiation of representations and warranties, at 
least from the perspective of information acquisition costs, presents the occasion for 
cooperative rather than distributive bargaining. Reducing the cost of acquiring infor-
mation needed by either party makes both better off. Yet practitioners report that the 
negotiation of representations and warranties is the most time-consuming aspect of 
the transaction .... Increased information costs needlessly result. 20 
13. Economists posit a continuum of exchanges ranging from the discrete transaction to relational 
contracts. See F. Robert Dwyer, Paul H. Schurr&: Sejo Oh, Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships,]. MAR-
KETING, Apr. 1987, at ll, 12; Gregory T. Gundlach&: Patrick E. Murphy, Ethical and Legal Foundations 
of Relational Marketing Exchanges,]. MARKETING, Oct. 1993, at 35, 36-37. 
14. In the Buddhist fable each of several blind men touched a different part of the elephant and 
reached a different conclusion about what it was. See jOHN GoDFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the El-
ephant, in THE PoETICAL WoRKS OF joHN GoDFREY SAXE 111, 111-12 (Houghton Mifflin 1882). 
15. Gilson, supra note 1, at 247. 
16. See id. at 257. 
17. See id. at 262-67. 
18. Id. at 266. 
19. See id. at 267-93. 
20. Id. at 272 (footnotes omitted). 
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In sum, lawyers expand the total pie by reducing the costs of regulation and 
information and by bridging differences of opinion about the future value of the 
asset being sold. Gilson notes that the last two require no knowledge of or license 
to practice law and that other professions (including investment bankers and ac-
countants) covet this work, yearning to snatch it from lawyers.21 To retain this 
interesting, challenging, lucrative work, Gilson exhorts lawyers to improve their 
performanceY To do so he touts drastic changes in legal education because "law 
schools [have] done so bad a job in training business lawyers."23 He does not urge 
teaching practice skills. 24 Rather, law schools should use finance and transaction 
cost economics to teach students "a theory of private ordering and ... how people 
order their relationships in the absence of regulatory interference."25 
B. LATER REVISIONS 
In the last twenty-five years, Gilson and others embellished his original thesis 
but retained its core. In 1993 Robert Gordon still maintained that we lack "thor-
ough, systematic descriptions and reflective analyses of wh:3.t it is that corporate 
lawyers actually do."26 Gilson acknowledged, albeit briefly, a broader concept of 
business lawyering encompassing reputation, expectations of repeated dealings, 
decision theory, and incentive structures in business transactions,27 but he never 
wove these elements into a new theory 
Some works mention activity absent from Gilson's thesis. Venture capital law-
yers, for example, added to the traditional functions of business lawyers the roles 
of matchmaking, helping to draft an entrepreneur's business plan, vouching for 
a client's honesty, and advising uninformed clients about industry practices and 
norms. 28 However, most accounts of business lawyers have been limited, even 
fragmentary. One recent essay even narrows Gilson's original portrait. Based on 
an empirical survey of business lawyers, Steven Schwarcz concludes that business 
lawyers add value primarily by reducing regulatory costs, not other transaction 
costs.29 
Changes in business lawyering are well known. Reams of practice-oriented 
journal articles and treatises have been churned out and continuing legal educa-
21. Id. at 294-95. 
22. See id. at 302. 
23. ld. at 303. 
24. ld. at 304. 
25. ld. at 305. 
26. Robert W Gordon, Lawyers, Scholars, and the "Middle Ground," 91 MICH. L. REv. 2075, 2088 
0993). 
27. See Ronald]. Gilson&: Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword: Business Lawyers and Value Creation for 
Clients, 74 OR. L. REv. 1, 7-9 (1995). 
28. See Usa Bernstein, The Silicon Valley Lawyer as Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REv. 239, 
245-51 (1995) [hereinafter "Bernstein, Silicon Valley Lawyer"]; lawrence M. Friedman, Robert W Gor-
don, Sophie Pirie &: Edwin Whatley, Laws, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon Valley: A Preliminary 
Report, 64 IND. L.]. 555, 557-66 (1989). 
29. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. ].L. Bus. &: FIN. 
486, 506-07 (2007) [hereinafter "Schwarcz, Transactional Lawyering"]. 
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tion is offered continually on tasks of business lawyers. However, these have not 
been integrated into a new description. 
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 
As Gilson noted, "There is nothing traditionally 'legal' about the role I have de-
scribed business lawyers as playing, nor are there any special requirements pe-
culiar to lawyers [such as admission to the bar] necessary to play this role."30 
Not surprisingly, then, as he also recognized, there is growing "competition for 
transactional responsibility ... with other professions."31 He pointed out that an 
acquisition "is surrounded by substantial regulatory structures." 32 And, he stated, 
"Because the lawyer must play an important role in designing the structure of 
the transaction in order to assure the desired regulatory treatment, economies 
of scope should cause the nonregulatory aspects of transactional structuring to 
gravitate to the lawyer as well."33 However, "the increasingly multidisciplinary 
character of the legal profession's most serious competitors threatens to overcome 
the economies of scope." 34 
To preserve lawyers' "central role in designing the structure of business trans-
actions,"35 Gilson advised major changes in legal education. He argued against a 
focus on practical skills like drafting and negotiation and familiarity with standard 
types of agreements because "most legal academics are not really competent to 
teach these skills" and "[l]aw firms and real practitioners, through some form of 
apprenticeship, are likely to do a far better job than any law school for a num-
ber of reasons."36 He urged instead more stress on finance and transaction cost 
economics.37 
In recent years corporate finance courses and a joint JD-MBA degree have be-
come more popular,38 but skills training of many kinds has also greatly expanded. 
Some of these skills are relevant to business law, including negotiation and con-
tract drafting. Some courses teach these skills in general, including courses in 
interpersonal dynamics,39 writing and drafting,40 negotiation,41 alternative dispute 
30. Gilson, supra note 1, at 295. 
3l. Id. at 301. 
32. ld. at 296. 
33. ld. at 298 (footnote omitted). 
34. rd. at 301. 
35. ld. (footnote omitted). 
36. rd. at 304. 
37. ld. at 305. 
38. Anthony]. Luppino, Minding More than Our Own Business: Educating Entrepreneurial Lawyers 
Through Law School-Business School Collaborations, 30 W NEW ENG. L. REv. 151, 177 & n.9l (2007) 
(listing reports of proliferation of JD-MBA programs, reaching 82 percent of ABA-approved law 
schools in 2002). 
39. See, e.g., Joshua D. Rosenberg, Interpersonal Dynamics: Helping Lawyers Learn the Skills, and the 
lmpm1ance, of Human Relationships in the Practice of Law, 58 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1225, 1258-69 (2004). 
40. See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lipson, Doing Deals in School, Bus. L. ToDAY, Sept./Oct. 2005, at 51, 55 
(describing a course offered by the author). 
4l. See, e.g., id. at 55. 
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resolution,42 and counselingY Others are geared specifically to business law.44 
Some use simulation.45 Traditional classroom courses also pay more attention 
now to practical lawyering skills.46 Thus, Gilson's advice has been ignored by legal 
educators including, ironically, Gilson himself: he now offers "deals" courses that 
teach "professional skills. "47 
In later work Gilson conceded the value of knowledge, like the theory of 
agency and of negotiation, in order to "understand the complexity of transactions 
and institutions" or, more grandly, to acquire "practical wisdom" and judgment. 48 
A more capacious concept of business lawyering is also embraced by others. In 
jonathan Lipsons Transactional Skills Workshop 
students ... set about doing the four things I think most good business lawyers 
routinely do: 
• help plan the deal, 
• investigate the facts and the law as the deal develops, 
• help negotiate it, and 
• draft the paperwork, once there is agreement in principle. 49 
As examples of planning issues, Lipson mentions division of power through com-
position of the board, choice of the shareholder vote needed to amend the charter, 
and protection in future rounds of financing. 5° 
Lipsons approach bears on Gilson in a few interesting ways. First, it tacitly 
acknowledges the importance of dividing the pie and not just of its total size. 
Second, Lipson does not require or expect any special knowledge of corporate fi-
nance or of transaction cost economics. 51 Third, he tacitly recognizes that much of 
the business lawyer's work occurs before parties reach an agreement in principle, 
a period Gilson ignored. 
Roberta Romano considers these changes in legal education "thoroughly in-
adequate .... [T]hose newer courses combined with other courses in the typical 
law school curriculum do not provide the technical level of knowledge that busi-
ness lawyers need to master to be at the forefront of their profession."52 Echoing 
Gilson, she says "[l]aw schools are not well-positioned to provide that knowledge 
on their own. "53 She urges "actively encouraging students seeking a business law 
42. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 1231 &: n.2l. 
43. See id. 
44. See, e.g., Tina Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54]. LEGAL Eouc. 223, 232 (2004) (describing 
a course called Business Essentials) [hereinafter "Stark, Deal Lawyer"]. 
45. See, e.g., Upson, supra note 40, at 51. 
46. See, e.g., Bridget McCormack, Teaching Professionalism, 75 TENN. L. REv. 251, 262-63 (2008). 
47. See Gilson&: Mnookin, supra note 27, at 7 n.2l. The two courses-a "Deals" class and "Deals 
Workshop"-are described in Victor Fleischer, Deals: Bringing Corporate Transactions into the Law School 
Gassroom, 2002 CoLUM. Bus. L. REv. 475, 490-92. 
48. Id. at 6-7. 
49. Lipson, supra note 40, at 53. 
50. Id. at 54-55. 
51. See id. at 55. 
52. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55]. LEGAL Eouc. 342, 352 (2005). 
53. Id. at 352. 
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career to enroll in joint degree prograrns."54 She also recommends creating ac-
celerated joint degree programs so that students could acquire the JD and MBA 
degrees in three rather than four years. 55 
Based on his own poll of business lawyers and clients, Steven Schwarcz parts 
with both Gilson and Romano by questioning 
an increased focus on finance theory and transaction-cost economics .... [T]he find-
ings suggest that budding transactional lawyers would be even better served by focus-
ing on law and on applying legal concepts to solve real-world problems-goals that 
the case method has a long and distinguished record of helping students achieve. 
Similarly, law schools should introduce, if not emphasize, the importance of develop-
ing good working relationships between opposing lawyers in business transactions. 56 
II. PROBLEMS IN THE RECEIVED MODEL 
A. TRANSACTION COSTS, OPPORTUNISM, AND RATIONAL BARGAINING 
Again, Gilson posits that "if all a business lawyer offers is skill in distributive 
bargaining, the clients' joint decision would be to hire no lawyers at all."57 There-
fore, lawyers must engage in ')oint problem solving in which, through coopera-
tion, the size of the pie, and hence the size of the piece received by each party, can be 
increased."58 These claims are misleading and generate confusion and error in the 
ensuing analysis. 
We should not exaggerate the novelty of the "value creation focus." It is mere 
common sense that a person will hire a lawyer (or any agent) if she thinks the lawyer 
will increase the value of the transaction (net of the lawyer's fee) to her.59 Clients were 
"value creationists" avant Ia Iettre. Gilson added analytical clarity and rigor, but the 
underlying insight is intuitive. Gilson is right that rational parties will agree to es-
chew lawyers (or any other agent or activity) if each expects to benefit from doing so. 
However, not all steps that expand the total pie also increase the slice of each party. 
For example, Gilson highlights the role of lawyers in producing and verifying 
information. 60 This activity does not enlarge the total pie (i.e., the value of the 
asset exchanged). Nonetheless, clients rationally pay lawyers (and other agents, 
like accountants) big fees for this service. Without information, the buyer must 
either trust the seller or assume the worst. Considerable trust is warranted in some 
cases, but not all. 61 Consider, for example, the innumerable e-mail offers from 
Nigeria to share a windfall. 
54. !d. at 353. 
55. !d. 
56. Schwarcz, Ti"ansactional Lawyering, supra note 29, at 507-08 (footnotes omitted). 
57. Gilson, supra note 1, at 245. 
58. !d. n.9 (emphasis added). 
59. See David M. Driesen &: Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction 
Cost Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 Aruz. L. REv. 61, 64 (2005) (noting "people and institutions 
paying lawyers' fees or other transaction costs obtain something of value"). 
60. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 267-93. 
61. See George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAw. 45, 62-66 (2002) (dis-
cussing factors that enhance or erode trust) [hereinafter "Dent, Lawyers and Trust"]. 
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The importance of information also torpedoes the idea of excluding lawyers (or 
other agents) altogether from a deal. In an acquisition the seller would happily 
urge it since lawyers' fees shrink the pie and the seller, who controls the asset, 
needs little information from the buyer. The buyer, though, needs full disclosure; 
it will not only reject the suggestion to forego lawyers but consider it so outra-
geous as to cast doubt on the seller's good faith. 
Gilson:S implication that expanding the pie guarantees each party a larger slice 
(and that shrinking the pie leaves each party a smaller slice) may explain his 
neglect of opportunism (i.e., self-interested behavior),62 including agency costs: 
he mentions these only briefly as a transaction cost in earnouts. 63 This is a major 
omission. 64 Transaction costs 
encompass the costs of deciding, planning, arranging, and negotiating the actions to 
be taken and the terms of exchange when two or more parties do business; the costs 
of changing plans, renegotiating terms, and resolving disputes as changing circum-
stances may require; and the costs of ensuring that parties perform as agreed. 55 
ln business deals opportunism is a major issue. 56 Consider again the produc-
tion and verification of information in an acquisition. This activity does not raise 
the value of the asset, but the buyer will insist upon it because the seller has 
an incentive to fabricate positive information and withhold negative information 
about that value. 
Skillful structuring of an exchange can shrink transaction costs, but not to zero.67 
Some transaction costs are inherent in any exchange; often they are so high that it 
is inefficient to make an arm:S-length exchange. This explains the existence of firms: 
"[l]n a world without transaction costs all activities would be carried out as exchanges 
between units, and it is due to the failure of markets, or arenas of exchange, to allow 
for many exchanges without prohibitively high governance costs that organizations 
come to exist."68 Opportunism looms even larger as we move from discrete, arm:S-
length transactions (like acquisitions) to repeat and relational contracts. 59 
62. Oliver Williamson defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile. This includes ... 
lying, stealing, and cheating." 0uVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, 
MARKETs, RELATIONAL CoNTRACTING 47 (1985). This definition seems to exclude the self-serving behavior 
that Gilson discusses, which involves no guile. This Article will understand "opportunism" to include 
all self-interested conduct. 
63. See Gilson, supra note l, at 266. 
64. See Geoffrey Miller, From dub to Markee The Evolving Role of Business Lawyers, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REv. ll05, 1109 (2005) ("The simple version of Gilson's model of attorneys as transaction cost engi-
neers also does not take account of the agency cost problem within firms."). 
65. Paul Milgrom &john Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic 
Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57, 60 (James E. Alt &: Kenneth A. Shepsle eds., 
1990) (emphasis omitted). 
66. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CoRPORATION LAw AND ECONOMICS 27 (2002) (stating that in corporate 
law the largest transaction costs are "uncertainty, complexity, and opportunism"). 
67. See Driesen &: Ghosh, supra note 59, at 64 (noting "transaction costs ... often aid the realiza-
tion of efficient transactions that would never occur without them"). 
68. Ran jay Gulati, Does Familimity Breed Trust? TI1e Implication of Repeated Ties for Contractual Choices 
in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT.]. 85, 87 (1995) (citation omitted) [hereinafter "Gulati, Familiarity"]. 
69. See infra notes l 73-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of these contracts. 
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Value Creation focuses on transaction costs but elides some of their complexities. 
Again, Gilson decries ubiquitous haggling over representations and warranties; 
parties should view this as "the occasion for cooperative rather than distributive 
bargaining. "70 They should identify who can best provide information or assume 
the risk that some information or assumption is wrong and adjust the sale price by 
the cost of accepting that burden. However, in practice representations and war-
ranties are negotiated only after the parties agree in principle on the price, which 
"does not usually change continuously as the lawyers negotiate other contractual 
provisions."71 Lawyers who try Gilson's approach "may find themselves accused 
of renegotiating the deal." 72 
Gilson also ignores the different exposures to liability on representations and 
warranties among the seller's shareholders. Only those who sign on to the repre-
sentations are liable if they prove false. 73 Unless the seller has only a few share-
holders who all sign the representations, not all shareholders do sign. Enhanced 
representations may fetch a higher acquisition price for all shareholders, but the 
increased threat of liability given in exchange extends to just a few, who naturally 
resist that burden regardless of who is the least-cost guarantor of information. 
B. THE NARROW DEFINITION OF "ACQUISITION" 
Gilson took a narrow view of what comprises the acquisition transaction. Basi-
cally, he analyzes only the activity after agreement in principle is reached. Thus, he 
excludes several terms, some of which are legally binding, some of which are not 
but are important nonetheless. He disregards agreement in principle on the price. 
Although this term is not legally binding, large companies enter into many trans-
actions, and trust is important in business deals. 74 To be trusted, a company must 
earn a reputation for fair dealing. Repudiating a deal after agreement in principle 
is reached sullies that reputation, so firms are loathe to do it, even though they 
are not legally bound. This disinclination compels their lawyers to behave in ways 
that may otherwise seem illogical.75 
Gilson ignores lock-up arrangements, like termination fees and bargain pur-
chase options, that make it costly for either side to repudiate a deal. He also over-
70. Gilson, supra note l, at 2S7. 
71. Edward Bernstein, Law & Economics and the Structure of Value Adding Contracts: A Contract Law· 
yer~ View of the Law & Economics Literature, 74 OR. L. REv. 189, l9S (l99S). 
72. jAMES C. FREUND, SMART NEGOTIATING: How TO MAKE GooD DEALS IN THE REAL WORLD 186 (1992). 
Proposing new terms may erode trust. "[B]y accepting the standard forms and not negotiating for 
unusual terms, parties signal that they will be cooperative after the closing." Robert B. Thompson, 
Value Creation by Lawyers Within Relational Contracts and in Noisy Environments, 74 OR. L. REv. 31S, 
317 (l99S). 
73. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 761, 769-73 (2008) 
(rejecting secondary liability under Rule lOb-S); In re DVI Inc. Sec. Litig., 249 F.R.D. 196, 216-18 
(E. D. Pa. 2008) (rejecting liability under Rule lOb-S of a law firm that helped to draft, but whose name 
did not appear on, a materially false corporate document). 
74. See Dent, Lawyers and TntSt, supra note 61, at 49-S2 (discussing the importance of trust in 
strategic alliances). · 
7S. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
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looks no-shop agreements that hinder competing bids for the target. Both sorts of 
arrangements are legally binding and buttress the non-binding terms: although a 
party who walks away is not liable for breach of contract, it may incur substantial 
liability or lose large benefits under the binding terms. 76 Drafting these arrange-
ments is an important function of the acquisition lawyer. 
Lawyers involved in preliminary deliberations are likely to be the parties' house 
counsel. Outside law firms that serve as special counsel in acquisitions often do 
not appear until many key issues-whether to do the deal at all, its scope (i.e., a 
full or partial acquisition), lock-ups, termination fees, satisfaction of fiduciary du-
ties, and price (probably including the basic terms of any eamout)-are already 
resolved. Only the esoteric issues on which Gilson dwells remain. 
Gilsons narrow vision of the acquisition transaction also colors his thoughts about 
the allegiances of the lawyers. He argues they should maximize the size of the pie 
without regard to its division. However, a lawyer (like the other negotiating parties) 
is an agent with a fiduciary duty to maximize the benefits to her principal.77 In ad-
dition to their legal duties, agents also care about their personal reputations. Some 
might praise an agent who prizes total deal value over the interests of his client, but 
few clients share that view. A lawyer (or any agent) negotiating a deal places the 
clients interests first if she cares about her own future. Concern about her reputa-
tion may cause outside counsel to be even more aggressive than the client wishes. 
c. THE NARROW VIEW OF "TRANSACTION" 
l. Arm's-Length Transactions Other than Acquisitions: 
Relational Contracts 
Gilson's focus on acquisitions distorts his conclusions because the role of law-
yers in other business deals is quite different. 78 Even in the few acquisitions that 
include an eamout, 79 the parties' interaction after the closing is limited, confined 
mostly to enforcing their contract rights. Absent an eamout, the parties often have 
little contact after the closing. (An exception is litigation, in which case they are 
fighting, not cooperating.) Generally, they do not anticipate future dealings. 
Many other deals entail a requirement or expectation of extensive future deal-
ings. Even in a single sale of goods the parties must often collaborate on deliv-
76. See DALE A. OESTERLE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 233-34 (2d ed. 2006) (describing 
these "deal protection" devices). 
77. See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAw OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 57-58 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that 
"[t]he law of Agency ... pretty generally governs the relationship between the lawyer and his client. 
This means that, for the most part, the same rules which apply to other agencies govern." (foomotes 
omitted)). 
78. To some extent he recognizes this. He acknowledges that an acquisition differs from "a com-
plex real estate transaction or joint venture," Gilson, supra note 1, at 257, though he does not explain 
how. 
79. See Srikant Datar, Richard Frankel & Mark Wolfson, Eamouts: The Effects of Adverse Selection 
and Agency Costs on Acquisition Techniques, 17 ].l. EcoN. & 0RG. 201, 216 (2001) ("The overall per-
centage of transactions involving reported eamouts is 4.1 %."); RoBERT E BRUNER, APPUED MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 611 (2004) (reporting that from 1992 to 2000 only 1.2 percent of deals had eamouts). 
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ery, installation, operation, and maintenance after the closing. Further, the parties 
often envision future intercourse between themselves (sometimes formalized in 
a long-term or "relational" contract)80 and with others, so they want to establish 
trust and cooperation and burnish their reputations. 
In contracts for services (which now comprise most economic activity81), col-
laboration is even more important. The services rendered and the cooperation 
needed are often so complex that contract terms can only vaguely sketch the 
parties' duties. Proving a breach in court, then, may be impossible absent flagrant 
misconduct,82 so that litigation is of little value in enforcing reasonable expecta-
tions. In many service and long-term sales contracts, the parties also expect to 
modify terms before the agreement expires. Given the impossibility of drafting 
and enforcing precise performance obligations, the parties often employ indirect 
solutions, like fair and efficient exit and termination arrangements.83 
Financings also require extensive interaction after the closing. In a large loan 
the borrower not only promises periodic payments but also accepts restrictive cov-
enants that limit the scope of its business and require it continually to meet speci-
fied financial tests and to disclose material information to the lender.84 The parties 
also realize that these covenants, however well drafted, may later hinder the bor-
rower in ways unnecessary to protect the lender. In that case, it is expected that the 
lender will sympathetically entertain a plea to revise a term or waive a right. 
2. Strategic Alliances 
In joint ventures and other strategic alliances (such as licenses, dealerships, 
and franchises), the parties' collaboration after the closing is the whole purpose 
of the deal.85 Written terms, then, are even less useful than in service and long-
term sales contracts. A writing can fix some measurable ancillary duties, such as 
how much money a party will contribute and what personnel it will second to the 
venture. The primary duty, however, cannot be precisely defined; it must often be 
described in such vague terms as "best efforts."86 
80. See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 
1089 (1991). 
81. See Coalition of Service Industries, http://www.uscsi.org/Statistics/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2008) 
("Services represent nearly 78% of US economic output and a similar proportion of employment."). 
82. See Roland Kirstein & Dieter Schmidtchen, judicial Detection Skill and Contractual Compliance, 
17 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 509, 512-14 (1997) (discussing the difficulties of contracting in situations 
where it may not be possible to prove breach to a court). 
83. See infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text. 
84. See Clifford Smith & jerold Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants, 7 
]. FIN. EcoN. 117, 125-46 (1979). 
85. "Strategic alliance" is a business term; it has no legal definition. It has been described as an 
arrangement "whereby two or more firms agree to pool their resources to pursue specific market op-
portunities." Gulati, Familiarity, supra note 68, at 85. Although there is no clear, precise line between 
relational contracts and strategic alliances, in the former each party typically performs a distinct, well-
defined function in a chain of production (as in a long-term sales contract); in alliances, the parties' 
duties are generally vaguer and their relationship is more symbiotic, requiring closer cooperation. 
86. See josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Biotechnology Industry, 46]. INous. EcoN. 125, 132 (1998) (asserting the impossibility of specifying 
exactly a requisite "level of effort" or "delivery of a specific innovation"). 
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The limited utility of the writing does not mean, however, that drafting is 
easier or less important or that the lawyers' role is less significant-quite the 
contrary. First, many issues of little relevance in acquisitions are often crucial in 
strategic alliances. These include misuse of proprietary information and defining 
the scope of the venture. The very purpose of an alliance is to achieve synergy 
between firms in related businesses, often in advanced technology. To do this, 
one or both parties must reveal valuable information that could be appropriated 
by the other_B? 
Alliances often last for many years.88 In setting the scope of the venture, the par-
ties do not want a fixed plan but flexibility to handle unexpected contingencies. 89 
If a venture is defined too broadly, it could include activity that a partner could 
pursue (more) profitably alone or with a third party. If it is too narrow, one party 
may appropriate the knowhow of its partner, hence denying the partner the fruits 
of its efforts. Vague contract terms may preserve flexibility but foster uncertainty 
about who owns opportunities that arise out of the venture or that come to one 
partner from an outsider.90 Parties in an alliance often start small and see what 
happens; if the venture prospers, they expand it. 91 Lawyers must craft a structure 
to suit the alliance through various stages or, at least, not pose undue difficulties 
when modification of the venture is needed. 
Given the difficulties of drafting precise contracts and proving a breach, indi-
rect solutions are employed here, too. A party may, for instance, contract for a 
87. See joanne E. Oxley, Appropriability Hazards and Govemance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction 
Cost Approach, 13 j.L. EcoN. &: 0RG. 387, 392 (1997). The problem often begins during negotiations 
before a final agreement is reached: "If the seller were to provide ... information in order to educate 
the buyer on the value of know-how for sale, he would, by revealing the information, be transfer-
ring the know-how free of charge." jean-Francais Hennart, A Ii·ansaction Cost Theory of Equity Joint 
Ventures, 9 STilATEGIC MGMT.]. 361, 365 (1988). "Hence, information is shared alongside sheaves of 
nondisclosure agreements, and, even then, there is selective hiding of critical components." Richard J. 
Zeckhauser, TI1e Challenge of Contracting for Technological Irifonnation, 93 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. USA, 
Nov. 1996, at 12743, 12744. 
88. See Lerner&: Merges, supra note 86, at 131-32 (stating that it often takes biotechnology joint 
ventures a decade or more to obtain FDA approval for their products). 
89. See Friedman, Gordon, Pirie&: Whatley, supra note 28, at 563 (stating that a venture financing 
often "does not try to spell out contingency plans for every conceivable event that could go wrong, 
but assumes that the parties will be able to cooperate sufficiently to work out flexible adjustments to 
changing circumstances"); Ran jay Gulati &: Harbir Singh, The Architecture of Cooperation: Managing 
Coordination Costs and Approp1iation Concerns in Strategic Alliances, 43 ADMIN. Sc1. Q. 781, 782 (1998) 
(refening to "an ongoing need for mutual adaptation and adjustment" in many alliances). 
90. See Steven I. Glover, Negotiating and Structuring joint Ventures: Lessons from Management Consul-
tants, M&:A LAw., Mar. 1998, at 1, 7 (noting "most high profile joint venture litigation turns on issues 
of scope"). See also David Ernst&: Stephen 1.. Glover, Strategic Alliances: Combining Legal and Business 
Practices to Create Successful Strategic Alliances, INSIGHTS, Oct. 1997, at 6, 10-11 (discussing dangers of 
defining venture scope either too broadly or too narrowly). 
91. See Rachel E. Kranton, The Fonnation of Cooperative Relatiomhips, 12 j.L. EcqN. &: 0RG. 214, 
227 0996) ("[I]ndividuals begin cooperative exchange relationships at low levels of exchange. As 
partners fulfill their exchange obligations, cooperation rises to higher levels."); Ranjay Gulati, Alliances 
and Networhs, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT.]. 293, 299 (1998) (noting "many joint ventures occur as options 
to expand in the future and are interim mechanisms") [hereinafter "Gulati, Alliances and Networhs"]. 
Some business analysts posit five phases in the evolution of an alliance: awareness, exploration, expan-
sion, commitment, and dissolution. See Dwyer, Schurr&: Oh, supra note 13, at 15-20. 
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right of easy exit in order to escape mistreatment. If exit is too attractive, though, 
it may be used to exploit the other party. . 
In many alliances one party is by law a fiduciary for the other. In some, includ-
ing joint ventures, they are mutual fiduciaries. 92 Unless otherwise agreed, then, 
they owe duties with regard to many matters, including proprietary information, 
business opportunities, and termination of the venture. Often parties wish either 
to limit or to expand these default rules. Designing solutions to all these problems 
requires great skill and is typically the province of the lawyers. 
3. "Internal" Transactions 
Even further removed from acquisitions are what might be called internal 
transactions, including the organization and reorganization of a business, equity 
financings, voting agreements, buy-sell-agreements, and executive employment 
contracts. Unlike strategic alliances, these transactions involve only parties who 
are or will become co-owners of the firm. However, unlike "housekeeping" chores 
that also occupy business lawyers, in these activities the participants legitimately 
act, at least in part, in their own interests and not just as agents of the firm. 
Internal transactions pose further quandaries for lawyers. Just identifying the 
client may be difficult. In general, the client of the corporate lawyer is supposed 
to be the corporation. 93 However, in a proposal to create stock with superior vot-
ing rights, for example, what are the interests of the corporation? Many deem 
shareholders the owners of the business to whom the fiduciary duties of the firm's 
agents are owed, but of course corporate lawyers tend to serve those who can hire 
and fire them-i.e., usually the executive officers, especially the CE094 
In internal transactions for non-public firms, a lawyer is often asked to work for 
more than one party She may do so if the parties' interests are not too divergent.95 
However, she must continually monitor the situation to be sure that the parties' 
92. A true joint venture is generally considered a general partnership. Every general partner of a 
partnership is an agent with authority to conduct the partnership's ordinary business. UNIF. P'sHIP ACT 
§ 9(1) (1914), 6 U.LA. 553 (2001); UNIF. P'sHIP ACT § 301(1) (1997), 6 U.L.A. 101 (2001); see 1 
RICHARD D. HARROCH, PARTNERSHIP &: jOINT VENTURE AGREEMENTS § 2.09(2), at 2-74 (1992) ("(E]ach 
joint venturer has the power and ability to bind the other joint venturer and to subject it to liability 
to third persons in matters which are within the scope of the enterprise."). Joint ventures are often 
incorporated, but the parties typically share control and thus are again mutual fiduciaries. See 1 HAR-
ROCH, supra, § 2.09(2), at 2-75. 
93. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.13(a) (2003) ("A lawyer employed or retained by an 
organization represents the organization acting though its duly authorized constituents."). 
94. See Miller, supra note 64, at 1109 ("Because the basic executive decisions-including the deci-
sions to hire and fire counsel-are usually made by corporate managers, the attorney will not necessar-
ily abide by the admonition that his or her duties run to the organization rather than its officers."). The 
Model Rules seem to condone this by instructing attorneys to accept the decisions of the corporation's 
authorized officers even if "their utility or prudence is doubtful." MoDEL RuLES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 
l.l3(a) cmt. 3 (2003). 
95. "Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest ... , a lawyer may represent 
a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and 
diligent representation to each affected client; ... and ( 4) each affected client gives informed consent, 
confirmed in writing." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.7(b) (2003). 
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interests have not come into conflict and must try to balance their interests fairly. 
Some internal transactions threaten serious conflicts of interest. In a strategic in-
vestment (or "equity link"), the investor has an interest in the company beyond 
the financial returns on its securities.96 A start-up software company, for instance, 
might raise equity capital from a large computer company that is one of its cus-
tomers and will therefore accept a smaller amount of stock than venture capitalists 
demand. However, the smaller firm's lawyers must fashion mechanisms to deter 
the large firm from stealing the smaller firm's technology or otherwise abusing its 
dual status as major stockholder and customer. 97 
A firm's lawyers must often weigh the effects of their work on shareholders as 
well as the entity. Decisions about the structure of the firm will determine the 
distribution of rights to profits, the risk of loss, and the power to control. They 
will also fix tax consequences and rights to employment, to transfer or redeem in-
terests in the firm, to terminate its existence, and rights upon termination. Other 
decisions define the scope of the enterprise and of fiduciary duties. 
ln addition to tensions between managers and investors, there are often con-
flicts among investors.98 lf there are two or more investors at the outset, they 
may quarrel over, for example, board representation. lf later financings bring in 
additional investors, the incumbents may clash with the newcomers over their 
respective privileges. Counsel for managers will be involved because the investors 
will be tempted to resolve their differences at the expense of the managers. 
Gilson's M&A specialists are outside counsel, but many internal transactions 
are handled by inside counsel who face unique problems.99 An in-house lawyer 
is subject to the CEO not just in one transaction but full time; his whole career 
is at stake. Some of the lawyer's work will touch his own interests, as when his 
firm makes an acquisition or disposition, erects takeover defenses, alters em-
ployee stock options and other compensation, or takes steps affecting firm risk 
or stock price. Such concerns cause some commentators to bewail lawyers' loss of 
96. See Thomas Hellmann, A Theory of Strategic Investing, 64]. FIN. EcoN. 285, 287 (2002). For a 
general discussion of strategic investments, see ALAN S. GuTTERMAN, CoRPoRATE CouNSEL's GuiDE TO STRA-
TEGIC ALLIANCES§§ 1:1-1:25 (2006 & Supp. 2008). 
97. See generally Ronald W Masulis & Rajarishi Nahata, Strategic Investing and Finandal Contracting 
in Start-ups: Evidence from Corporate Venture Capital (European Corporate Governance lnst., Working 
Paper No. 189/2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891605 (describing special arrangements 
that are made to limit the influence of strategic investors in start-up firms). 
98. See generally Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False Dichotomy of the 
Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REv. 37 (2006). Part of the problem is that "[a]lmost all venture and buyout 
funds are designed to be 'self-liquidating,' that is, to dissolve after ten or twelve years." PAuLA. GoMPERS & 
]OSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 19 (2000). A fund nearing dissolution will have a different time 
frame than other investors. 
99. Inside counsel "are not lawyers in the pure sense anymore. They are a unique hybrid that is part 
lawyer, part business leader and, in some cases, part entrepreneur." Irene E. Taylor, The Top 40 Corpo-
rate Counsel: 40 and Under 40, LEXPERT, Nov./Dec. 2005, at 60, 61 (quoting jim Riley, senior corporate 
parmer at Ogilvy Renault). See generally Deborah DeMott, The Discrete Roles of General Counsel, 7 4 
FoRDHAM L. REv. 955 (2005); Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel, and Entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAw & Soc'y REV. 457 (2000); Carl D. 
Liggio, The Changing Role of Corporate Counsel, 46 EMoRY L.j. 1201 (1997). 
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independence. 100 On the other hand, inside counsel has more opportunity to act as 
an entrepreneur, not just as an outside advisor, and may aspire to the firm's highest 
executive offices. 
In internal transactions lawyers often perform services far beyond normal legal 
advice. Again, Gilsons model is a large acquisition in which business issues are 
decided before the lawyers enter, and the parties are aided by a large cast of 
sophisticated, specialized business experts; the lawyers are confined to a small 
niche. In non-public firms the lawyer is often present in the beginning, at the 
creation. Moreover, the parties, though skilled in their business, often know little 
of finance and have no investment bankers or other experts to advise them. They 
often want a lawyer who can handle financial and business problems as well 
as give legal advice. Performing these tasks requires skills unnecessary to M&A 
specialists. 101 
D. THE EXCLUSIVE Focus ON TRANSACTIONS 
Gilson cannot be faulted for covering what he chose-transactions. However, 
his conclusions are misleading because the very title of his article implies a broader 
compass by referring to "business lawyers." Much work of business lawyers does 
not entail "transactions." Business lawyers advise corporate boards and officers 
in satisfying their fiduciary and other legal duties. They oversee the firm's com-
pliance with regulations and contracts. This work demands skills different from 
those needed in transactions. 
E. ScHWARcz's ALTERNATIVE VIEW 
Steven Schwarcz polled business lawyers and their clients and found (contrary 
to Gilson) that lawyers add value primarily by reducing regulatory costs. 102 This 
finding may be flawed, however, because of the questions asked. The only ques-
tion about opportunism asks: "To what extent are you responsible for anticipat-
ing, and drafting to protect your client against, possible future events that could 
change the business incentives of other transaction parties?" 103 Many respondents 
probably did not understand this question to address opportunism. Further, the 
question mentions only "possible future events that could change the business 
incentives." This does not cover incentives created immediately by a transaction, 
as when a party in a new venture is free to engage in self-dealing. It may not even 
cover future events (like termination) that are not just "possible" but predictable. 
100. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 64, at 1121-26. Professor Miller concludes that "changing eco-
nomic conditions ... significantly altered the cost -benefit calculation facing attorneys confronted with 
the question of whether to exercise independence." !d. at 1121. See also Paul D. Paton, Corporate Coun-
sel as Corporate Conscience: Ethics and Integrity in the Post-Enron Era, 84 CANADIAN Bus. REv. 533, 538 
(2005) (stating that an in-house lawyer is particularly "vulnerable" in confronting ethical challenges). 
101. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text. 
102. Schwarcz, Ji·ansactional Lawyering, supra note 29, at 486, 500. 
103. !d. at 512. 
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Another question asks: "[W]hen you represent an ordinary business [as op-
posed to 'a bank or other regulated entity'] in a business transaction, [do] you 
need to provide expertise in the law and regulations that generally govern that 
type of transaction ... ?"104 Not surprisingly, over 93 percent of lawyers and 94 
percent of clients answered "yes." This hardly proves that business lawyers serve 
primarily to reduce regulatory costs. "Law" includes the mandatory and default 
rules of business entities, including fiduciary duties, and contract law. In this 
question the work of enterprise design is lumped together with U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Uniform Commercial Code filings. 
The phrasing of his questions may have been shaped by the range of busi-
ness activity on which he focuses. He says lawyers "usually concentrate in such 
transaction-regulatory intensive areas as securities law, M&:A, bank lending, 
structured finance, and project finance." 105 This disregards strategic alliances, in-
ternal transactions, and non-transactional work, which involve different activities 
and skills. 
III. A BROADER PERSPECTIVE 
A. A BROADER RANGE OF PRACTICE 
1. Including Other Transactions and Strategic 
Alliances-The Virtual Corporation 
Gilson ignores debt financings, relational contracts, and strategic alliances. The 
disregard of strategic alliances is understandable but crippling. He wrote in 1984, 
when alliances were rare; since then they have become much more prevalent106 and 
are of rapidly growing importance to lawyers. 107 Many alliances involve high risk108 
and, "[i]n general, the more legal risk there is, the more necessary and valuable 
legal services are. "109 A joint venture differs from a discrete exchange because the 
104. Id. at 513 (emphasis added). 
lOS. Id. at 535. 
106. See Matthew Schifrin, Partner or Perish, FoRBES, May 21, 2001, at 26 (reporting rapid growth 
of corporate partnerships and alliances); Blair H. Sheppard & Marla Tuchinsky, Micro-OB and the 
Network Organization, in TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: fRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 140, 140 (Roderick 
M. Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996) ("Hierarchy and market are moving aside for the bound-
aryless firm, the virtual organization, and the network organization." (internal citations omitted)); 
id. at 141 (noting "hierarchy and market are being replaced with more connected, lateral forms of 
organization"). 
107. See Glover, supra note 90, at 4 (estimating that in 2000 alliances "account[ed] for more than 
20% of the average large firms revenues" and noting a 20 percent annual increase in the value of stra-
tegic alliances involving Fortune 1000 companies in preceding years). 
108. See David T. Robinson, Strategic Alliances and the Boundmies of the Finn i (June 14, 2006), 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=293721 (finding that "alliances cluster in risky, high-growth, 
high-tech industries"). 
109. Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Shewing the Results: The Role of Lawyers in 
Ii·ammitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAt. lNTERDISC. L.]. 375, 377 (1997). 
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parties need to cooperate to an extent that cannot be specified by contract. no The 
law recognizes this by treating the parties as partners and mutual fiduciaries. 111 
Even acquisitions are often more complicated than Gilson realized. In acquisi-
tions by private equity firms, the parties "utilize norms, conventions and outside 
constraints to fill contractual gaps. "112 The failure of lawyers "to properly assess 
risks and to innovate" may have led to the collapse of many recent acquisitions 
and to the ensuing lawsuits. 113 Since complete contracts are impossible, lawyers 
fashion indirect means to encourage collaboration and deter opportunism. They 
are also part of a team working to foster collegiality. The skills they need differ 
from those needed for discrete exchanges.n4 
Few firms that enter into a relational contract or alliance stop at one; most have 
several, which further complicates the lawyer's task. Many alliances include three 
or more partners, which drastically increases complexity.m Sometimes several 
firms organize a more or less formal network. 116 Each relationship must be viewed 
not alone but as part of a web of agreements; each piece must fit into a complex 
puzzle. Both economists and lawyers often find it useful to envision the corpora-
tion as a nexus of contracts-i.e., "not as an entity, but as an aggregate of various 
inputs acting together to produce goods or services."117 The platonic ideal of this 
concept is the "virtual corporation," a firm with no employees except a manage-
ment team and no assets but what the managers need to function; the managers 
contract for all the firms other inputs_ us Although this is only an ideal, a number 
of real firms approximate that ideal: "hierarchy and market are being replaced 
with more connected, lateral forms of organization. "119 
110. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
111. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. In alliances with foreign companies, however, 
American lawyers must be aware that foreign law often imposes fiduciary duties different from ours. 
See Susan Perkins, Randall Morek &: Bernard Yin Yeung, Innocents Abroad: The Hazards of Interna-
tional joint Ventures with Pyramidal Group Firms 18 &: n.14 (Feb. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1097265 (stating that for firms that are part of a business group, foreign law often imposes 
on the directors and officers fiduciary duties to the group, not to the individual unit). 
112. Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL.l. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (manu-
script at 6, on file with The Business Lawyer). 
113. Id. at 56. 
114. See Sandra M. Huszagh &: Frederick W. Huszagh, Lawyers as Exchange Engineers in Commerce: 
An Empirical Overview, 74 OR.l. REV. 147,174 (1995). 
115. "[R]unning a triparty joint venture was extremely difficult, especially with respect to ... direc-
tion and control." KATHRYN RUDIE HARRIGAN, STRATEGIES FOR jOINT VENTURES 368 (1985); see also Gulati, 
Familiarity, supra note 68, at 96 ("[M]ultilateral alliances pose larger organizational problems."). 
116. See Hans B. Thorelli, Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT.]. 37, 38 
(1986); Sheppard&: Tuchinsky, supra note 106, at 140. 
117. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 66, at 27. 
118. See john A. Byrne, Richard Brandt &: Otis Port, The Virtual Corporation, Bus. WK., Feb. 8, 
1993, at 98; Ann E. Conaway Stilson, The Agile Virtual Corporation, 22 DEL.]. CoRP. l. 497, 499-502 
(1997). 
119. Sheppard&: Tuchinsky, supra note 106, at 141. See also Bengt Holmstrom &john Roberts, The 
Boundmies of the Firm Revisited, 12]. EcoN. PERSP. 73, 85 (1998) (discussing some examples of virtual 
corporations). Gilson himself has discussed some parallel trends in creating new devices to divide risk. 
See Ronald]. Gilson &: Charles K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, 
and Complete Capital Markets, 108 CoLUM. l. REV. 231, 245-47 (2008). 
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2. Including Internal Transactions and Non-Transactional 
Business Practice 
Lawyers in internal transactions and non-transactional practice generally han-
dle matters more personal to the client firm's officers than do M&A specialists 
and often serve more than one master; as a consequence, strong interpersonal 
skills are desirable. Unlike M&:A specialists, they join the action before the major 
business issues have been resolved, so they need greater sensitivity to business 
concerns than do M&:A lawyers. 
Much of the work of business lawyers does not involve transactions at alL This 
non-transactional work falls roughly into two categories. One comprises routine 
or repeating matters, sometimes called "housekeeping." These include advising 
the board of directors and ensuring that it meets its duty of care;120 proceeds 
properly when some directors are interested in a matter before the board; 121 and 
complies with the law in the board's own regular activities, like electing corporate 
officers and fixing their powers and compensation, holding shareholder meetings, 
and declaring dividends. 122 Counsel also advises both the board and firm employ-
ees on legal questions arising in the firm's regular business operations, including 
issues of employment and agency law; contract formation, performance, and en-
forcement; and compliance with regulatory and tax laws. If the firm is a public 
company, it must also obey the proxy rules and periodic reporting requirements of 
the federal securities laws. 123 Generally such matters are handled by house coun-
sel or a regular outside counsel. 
The second category of non-transactional practice includes extraordinary mat-
ters. Many of these, such as an uncontested amendment of the charter to increase 
the number of authorized shares, are uncomplicated and are handled by the firm's 
regular counseL Others are complex and require specialized outside counseL Ex-
amples of such work are a reorganization of the company and its subsidiaries, 
construction of anti-takeover defenses, and orchestration of a proxy fight. 
A thorough catalogue of non-transactional business practice is unnecessary, but 
listing a few of these activities is instructive. One growing area of business practice 
is preventive law; that is, "periodically evaluating a client's business situation to 
identify potential legal problems ... and to develop and recommend appropri-
ate action accordingly."124 The range of legal problems that can be so addressed 
120. See, e.g., In re Caremark lnt'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(suggesting in dicta that directors' duty of care may require creation of program to monitor company's 
compliance with law); MoDEL Bus. CoRP. Acr § 8.31(a)(2)(iv) (2005) (imposing liability on directors 
for a "sustained failure" to act in the face of a clear warning). 
121. See DEL GEN. ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2001) (governing interested transactions). 
122. See id. § 142(b) ("Officers shall be chosen in such manner ... as [is] prescribed by the bylaws 
or determined by the board of directors or other governing body."); id. § 170(a) (governing declara-
tion and payment of dividends); id. § 2ll(b) (requiring an annual shareholders' meeting). 
123. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 14, 15, 15 U.S. C. §§ 78n, 78o (2006), and the rules 
thereunder. 
124. Peter]. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century: Adding Value to the 
Oient~ Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. lNTELL. PROP. L REv. 17, 50 (2003). 
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is wide and includes employment issues (like employment discrimination and 
sexual harassment), protection of confidential information (including intellectual 
property), and compliance with environmental laws. 
3. Serving Non-Public Firms 
Again, lawyers for non-public firms handle many matters beyond mergers, get 
involved in matters earlier than M&A specialists do, and serve clients who have 
no flock of business advisors. 125 These firms want a lawyer who understands 
their business and can offer financial advice. In some cases-as when several 
parties create a new business-one lawyer may be asked to represent them all. 
In appropriate cases the lawyer may do so, but she must treat all parties fairly. 126 
Alternatively, a lawyer may serve as a mediator helping parties to reach agree-
ment.127 In that case a lawyer needs not only the technical skills of enterprise 
design but also an understanding of the interests of each party as to risk of loss 
and sharing in the control and benefits (including profits, employment compen-
sation, perquisites, buy-sell rights, rights in firm property, liquidation rights, and 
tax benefits) of the firm. 
Two aspects of this work merit comment. First, knowledge of business is 
important here, but it has little to do with the transaction cost economics that 
Gilson deems crucial for business lawyers. A start-up company, for instance, may 
need help to draft a business plan and to get a hearing from venture capitalists. 128 
Second, this work may be especially suited for lawyers. They enjoy substantial 
economies of scope (as Gilson calls it) because the work entails legal issues of 
fiduciary duties, default rules, property (including intellectual property) rights, 
and taxes. Further, in most cases no investment bankers or other sophisticated 
consultants are involved. Clients are more cost conscious here than in the large 
acquisitions on which Gilson dwells. 
The role lawyers play here also raises questions about Gilson's critique of dis-
tributive bargaining versus joint problem solving. His view may make sense in a 
merger when both parties are sophisticated and advised by business experts before 
agreement in principle is reached and the M&A lawyers are called in. The par-
ties are then committed, at least tentatively, to the deal. As Gilson himself partly 
recognizes, conditions are different earlier in the game. Parties do not reach agree-
ment in principle unless each believes the deal will yield it profit net of transaction 
125. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
126. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
127. MoDEL RuLES OF PRDF'L CoNDUCT R. 2.4(a) (2003) (permitting a lawyer to serve as "a mediator 
or in such other capacity as will enable the lawyer to assist the parties to resolve" a dispute if certain 
conditions are met). 
128. See Bernstein, Silicon Valley Lawyer, supra note 28, at 245-46; Friedman, Gordon, Pirie &: 
Whatley, supra note 28, at 562. Some firms hire non-lawyers to provide these services, but other 
Silicon Valley lawyers prefer to perform this task themselves. See Zusha Elinson, Fenwick Hires Non-
Lawyer to Introduce dients to Venture Capital Funds, THE REcoRDER, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.law. 
com/jsp/article.jsp?id=119460264 734 7. 
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costs. As Gilson puts it, absent that belief pies never get baked at all. 129 Lawyers 
must participate in the distributive bargaining needed to support that belief. 
Gilson argues that if lawyers perform only pie-shrinking distributive bargain-
ing, the parties will rationally agree to exclude them. 130 In many cases there are 
problems with that option, as when one party is sophisticated and the other is 
not. Consider an entrepreneur who has a valuable idea but is unsophisticated 
in business and finance and seeks funding from a venture capitalist. The latter 
is a sophisticated repeat player and would be happy to dispense with lawyers. 
The entrepreneur, though, cannot tell whether an offer is fair to her; she needs a 
lawyer's advice. 
B. TECHNICAL SKILLS: ENTERPRISE DESIGN 
The business lawyer needs technical skills in what might be called "enterprise 
design"-that is, creating the best entity structure for each enterprise. 131 A brief 
overview gives an idea of the issues this entails. 
l. Choice and Scope of Entity 
The first question in designing an enterprise is whether it should be created at 
all. This is a business question, but even financially sophisticated clients may need 
lawyers to resolve it because legal issues may determine whether the venture can 
be profitable. Some legal issues are regulatory, such as what will be the tax treat-
ment of the enterprise and its participants; whether proprietary information can 
be protected by patents or copyrights or already belongs to others; what licenses 
or regulatory approvals are needed; and the costs of complying with regulation, 
such as environmental and securities laws. 
Lawyers may also help gauge the transaction and agency costs of the venture 
and whether it is possible to arrange the private ordering (or design the enter-
prise) so as to be profitable. This determination requires consideration of all the 
enterprise design issues discussed in this section, beginning with the choice of 
entity. 132 The lawyer must first see what options are available. The choices are 
I d. 
129. Gilson, supra note 1, at 312. He said: 
[T]he manner in which the pie is carved can have enormous impact on the number of pies that 
are baked in the future. The decision to invest in the next pies creation depends not just on the 
size of the pie in the abstract, but on the piece that the investor actually receives. 
130. Id. at 245. 
131. "The lawyers don't just solve problems facing a business venture. The lawyers help conceive 
the venture in the first place or, at an early stage, they're instrumental in funding and implementing the 
project." lARRY SMITH, INSIDE/OUTSIDE: How BUSINESSES BUY LEGAL SERVICES 137 (2001). 
132. See generally Oxley, supra note 87. See also WILLIAMSON, supra note 62, at 18 ("Transaction costs 
are economized by assigning transactions (which differ in their attributes) to governance structures 
(the adaptive capacities and associated costs of which differ) in a discriminating way."); Charles R.T. 
O'Kelley, Delaware Corporation Law and Transaction Cost Engineering, 34 GA. L. REv. 929, 941 (2000) 
(stating "[t]he corporate lawyer ... can increase the value of a prospective business association by 
selecting for it the optimal type of business organization"). 
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multiplying. 133 Some ventures are ineligible for certain choices. 134 The choice of 
entity can influence or completely resolve such issues as the tax treatment of the 
entity and its participants, whether the participants are personally liable for the 
debts of the venture, and the fiduciary duties of the parties. 135 
Lawyers also help fix the scope of the enterprise, including its time frame, 
geographic scope, and range of business. Participants may not usurp business 
opportunities that belong to the entity, but the default rules about what opportu-
nities belong to an entity are vague. 136 For example, some technology has several 
uses. If the technology will evolve during the life of the venture, it may be hard 
to predict what uses will emerge. 137 To avoid problems, parties often alter the 
default rules. 138 Although allotting opportunities is a business issue, mastery of 
property law and fiduciary duties is needed to achieve the desired results. The 
scope of the enterprise may also depend on what obligations the parties already 
have in other ventures, 139 a question which the lawyers may have to help an-
swer. A company might have numerous alliances and must take care that a new 
one does not collide with an existing one or foreclose desirable alliances in the 
future. 
To resolve these issues parties make extensive disclosures. Gilson recognizes 
disclosure as the central bailiwick of lawyers in acquisitions, 140 but disclosure is 
even more complex in relational contracts, alliances, and internal transactions. In 
an acquisition disclosure ends after the closing (except for purposes of an earnout, 
if there is one). Ongoing transactions require cooperation between the parties, 
which requires continual disclosure over the life of the venture. 
133. See George S. Geis,The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming 
2009) (stating "the possibility that we are moving toward an increasingly complete array of operational 
alternatives") (manuscript at 5, on file with The Business Lawyer). 
134. For example, an S corporation cannot be used for an entity with a corporate shareholder. 
l.R.C. § 1361(b) (2006). 
135. See, e.g., FRANKLlN A. GEVURTZ, BUSlNESS PLANNlNG 58-112 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing choice of 
entity) [hereinafter "GEVURTZ, BUSlNESS PLANNlNG"]. 
136. See FRANKLlN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION lAW§ 4.2. 7, at 362 (2000) (noting that "[u]nfortunately, 
courts have been unable to come up with any clear tests for resolving this issue" of what constitutes a 
business opportunity). 
137. In research and development ventures, for example, "adequate specification of property rights 
will inevitably be problematic, since the contracted assets do not exist at the time the contract is writ-
ten, and technological innovation is a highly uncertain process." Oxley, SL!pra note 87, at 394. See 
also Hennart, supra note 87, at 366 (noting that, when knowledge is "embedded in the individual 
possessing it[,] ... its exchange must rely on intimate human contact"). If the individual is made an 
employee, though, the individual is vulnerable to breach of implicit contracts. See Andrei Shleifer & 
Lawrence Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSE-
QUENCES 33,37-41 (Alan Auerbach ed., 1988). 
138. See GEVURTZ, BusrNESS PLANNlNG, supra note 135, at 168 ("A well drafted provision expressing 
the parties' intent as to the extent of each owners obligation to present to the finn any opportunities, 
inventions and the like, might avoid litigation if such events occur."). 
139. 'The opportunity set of each finn outside the particular alliance crucially affects its behavior 
within the alliance." Tatun Khanna, Ranjay Gulati & Nitin Nohria, The Dynamics of Learning Alli-
ances: Competition, Cooperation, and Relative Scope, 19 STRATEGlC MGMT.]. 193, 205 (1998) (emphasis 
omitted). 
140. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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For like reasons, collaborative enterprises also pose thornier problems of pro-
tecting proprietary information than acquisitions do. In an acquisition the seller 
must beware that the buyer does not obtain valuable information and then repu-
diate the deal and exploit the information. At the closing, however, ownership of 
the information is transferred and the problem ends. In collaborative ventures the 
problem persists for the life of the venture. Moreover, since cooperation is essential 
(to develop some technology, for example), the other party's need to know certain 
information may go far beyond what is needed to establish its financial value. 
To some extent lawyers can tackle these problems directly with confidentiality 
agreements, although these agreements will be more complicated than those in a 
routine acquisition. Proving a breach of a confidentiality agreement (which may not 
be an issue after the closing in an acquisition) is typically difficult, though, because 
breach is usually surreptitious. The lawyers must further protect confidential infor-
mation indirectly: A party owning technology may, for example, contract for rights 
to do inspections of the other party so as to detect and prove any misuse of the 
technology. The parties may agree to some form of alternative dispute resolution 
before experts and with more liberal rules of evidence so that misappropriations of 
confidential information can be more easily proven. A party may also contract for 
easy exit in case it believes its partner is misusing proprietary information. 141 
2. Governance, Disputes, Profit Sharing, and Incentives 
In public corporations the default rules for governance are generally followed. 
In non-public firms they are often altered, and relational contracts and alliances 
typically employ customized governance rules. An initial question is whether the 
parties will have equal voices. If so, neither can bully the other, but disagreement 
can mean deadlock. To prevent this they may provide for a neutral arbiter. Firms 
with venture capital, for example, often give a minority of board seats to both 
the managers and the investor and then have one or more neutral directors. 142 
Neutral directors can fashion a board majority by voting with one side against 
the other, but they try not to let disagreements reach this point. Instead, realizing 
the importance of trust and cooperation between the two sides, they try to per-
suade one side of the reasonableness of the other's position or to hammer out a 
compromise. The parties may also provide for mandatory bargaining, mediation, 
or arbitration. 143 
141. See generally infra Pan Ill.B.3. 
142.. See jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 967, 988--89 (2.006) (discussing use of neutral directors); Steven N. Kaplan & Per 
Stromberg, Finandal Contracting The01y Meets the Real World: An Empilical Analysis of Venture Capital 
Contracts, 70 REv. EcoN. Srun. 2.81, 2.89-90 (2.003) (reporting frequent use of neutral directors). 
143. See Eric Rasmusen, A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining: Explaining Incomplete Contracts 
45 (Apr. 2.7, 2.001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Business Lawyer) (stating that manda-
tory bargaining "can raise welfare by overcoming pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs"); Bernstein, 
Silicon Valley Lawyer, supra note 2.8, at 2.41 (stating that alternative dispute resolution is preferred 
by many firms); Thomas]. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2.001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 
847-51 (claiming benefits from terms requiring parties to negotiate requests for contract revisions). 
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If two parties will not share overall governance equally; each may be given 
control of some sphere of the venture. If one party gets general control, its power 
may be limited by giving the junior partner a veto over certain matters. 144 They 
may agree, for example, that one will run the daily operations but that both must 
approve major changes. If use of the veto could cause a debilitating impasse, they 
can provide for alternative dispute resolution. 
If one party gets control, the other may need protection from oppression. Pro-
tection may be generaL For instance, the junior partner may get a right to exit and 
have its interest bought out by the senior partner, either at the junior's discretion 
or if certain objective events occur. Alternatively; protection may be created for 
specific problems. To assure a party income, for example, she can be given either 
an employment contract at stipulated compensation or stock with features that 
encourage the payment of dividends. 145 
The parties must also agree on financial rights in the enterprise. It is generally 
wise to allocate these in the same proportions as the governance rights. Trouble 
brews when, as in public companies, those who control have a small equity inter-
est. Their incentive then is to maximize their own compensation, to the detriment 
of the equity owners (i.e., the shareholders). 146 However, identical divisions of 
control and financial rights can cause problems. For example, if the managers 
and investors of a firm agree to divide profits equally; the investors may reason-
ably argue that profits begin only after they get back their initial contributions. To 
reach this result the parties may give the investors preferred stock with a liquida-
tion preference. 147 
Governance terms largely reflect the bargaining power and prowess of the par-
ties and their lawyers, but those terms may also depend in part on their ability 
to maximize the value of the venture. One example is executive compensation. 
Investors want managers to be rewarded only if they succeed. Even in a public 
company, designing efficient rewards is difficult. Stock and stock options are use-
ful because stock price is the best measure of firm success. 148 However, the price 
may rise or fall because of trends in the firm's industry or in the economy gener-
144. See D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L REV. 315, 346 (2005) 
(reporting high incidence of veto rights of venture capitalists over various actions) [hereinafter "Smith, 
Venture Capital"]. 
145. See DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 589, 595-97 (2006) (discuss-
ing situation in which those managing a close corporation get employment contracts and common 
stock and participants not involved in management get preferred stock with features that encourage 
payment of dividends). 
146. Separation of ownership and control was first brought to light by Berle and Means. See ADOLF 
A. BERLE,jR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119-21 (1932). The 
problem persists. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & jESSE fRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2 (2004 ). 
147. See Bartlett, supra note 98, at 59-60, 76-77 (explaining reasons for, and illustrating use of, 
liquidation preferences); Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 142, at 284 (reporting high frequency of use 
of convertible preferred stock in venture capital financings). 
148. See RoBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 55 (1995) (stating that market 
share price has "unique value" and that other measures of value "are so highly flexible that they have 
limited significance"). 
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ally rather than because of the performance of the individual firm. By definition, a 
non-public firm has no market price for its stock, so designing executive compen-
sation to supply optimal incentives is even more problematic. 149 
Steps may also be needed to deter opportunism. If a party fails to perform as 
intended, the other may terminate the contract, sue for damages, or both, but 
litigation is slow and expensive, and proving a breach may be difficult or impos-
sible.150 One solution is for one or both parties to deliver a hostage-i.e., an asset 
or right that is worth more to the giver than to the receiver. 151 Because it values 
the hostage more, the giver is motivated to perform so as to get the hostage back; 
since the receiver values the hostage less, it is not motivated to keep the hostage 
unless the giver breaches the contract. 
Such arrangements are particularly important if the parties to an alliance will 
incur costs or reap benefits at different times. If one party has contributed far 
more than it has received, the other may be tempted to grab the benefits of that 
contribution and leave. 152 For example, a distributor may spend heavily to cul-
tivate a market for a suppliers product, expecting to recover its costs from com-
missions on future sales. The supplier might then switch to another distributor 
who will accept a lower commission because it has not incurred the development 
costs. The first distributor will want assurances against such opportunism, but 
the supplier will want freedom to terminate if the distributor performs poorly. 
Again, the lawyer must fashion an efficient solution, one that meets the legitimate 
concerns of both sides. 
3. Exit and Termination 
Another issue ignored by Gilson but central to strategic alliances is termination. 
In acquisitions each party contracts for a discrete performance. Except in the few 
deals with an eamout, there is little to do after the closing. By contrast, partici-
pants know that alliances do not last forever, even though they cannot know at 
the outset when their own venture will cease. The law provides default rules for 
withdrawal from an alliance,153 but the parties often do not want the default rules, 
so they must fashion their own termination provisions. 
Finding the ideal solution is not easy because termination may invite oppor-
tunism. For example, the default rule in joint ventures is that either party may 
terminate at any time and compel an auction of the venture's assets. 154 Often only 
149. See DRAKE, supra note 145, at 262-64, 267-68 (discussing elements of an effective incentive 
compensation plan and dangers of specifying compensation). 
150. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
151. See Royce de R. Barondes, The Business Lawyer as Ten01ist Transaction Cost Engineer, 69 
FORDHAM L. REv. 31, 40-44 (2000) (discussing hostages in business transactions). 
152. See Khanna, Gulati & Nohria, supra note 139, at 198. 
153. See, e.g., infra note 154 and accompanying text. 
154. UNIF. P'sHIP Acr § 38(1) (1914), 6 U.L.A. 487 (2001) (providing that on dissolution, unless 
otherwise agreed, any partner who has not wrongfully dissolved may demand that the surplus (if any) 
be distributed "in cash."). "In effect, this gives each partner the right to force a sale of the partnership 
assets .... " j. DENNIS HYNES, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE LLC IN A NUTSHELL§ 94, at 188 (1997)). 
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one party can afford to pay fair value for the assets. That party could terminate 
and then grab the assets at the auction for one dollar more than the inadequate 
amount the other party can bid. Courts sometimes construe fiduciary duties to 
prevent such behavior but, again, litigation is lengthy and expensive, proof of 
breach is often difficult, and the substantive tests are vague and do not deter all 
opportunism. 155 Even if both parties can afford to buy the assets, one or both par-
ties may not know the value of the assets. 
Lawyers employ various devices to deter opportunistic termination. One pro-
vides that if a party withdraws, the other party may buy the assets at a low price. 156 
This deters exit except for compelling reasons. Another provides that if a party 
withdraws, the other recovers the property it contributed.157 This prevents a party 
from grabbing assets contributed by the other at a low price. A third method is a 
Russian roulette buyout, in which the terminating party must name a price for the 
venture. The other party can then elect either to buy the terminating party's inter-
est or to sell its own interest to the terminating party at that price. 158 This places 
more of the burden of uncertainty on the departing party. 
An opposite problem is that an investor may get "locked-in" to an investment 
that is illiquid and gives no payouts. This can happen if the venture neither fails 
nor flourishes but lands in "limbo," healthy enough to pay its managers' com-
pensation and other costs, but not so profitable as to go public or pay dividends. 
This fate may be worse than failure for an investor because in case of failure the 
investor can at least recognize a tax loss on its investment. 159 Even if the com-
pany prospers, most investors eventually want to cash in their stock. Although 
the managers generally share that desire, they may disagree about the manner or 
timing of obtaining liquidity.160 Accordingly, investors need to arrange exit mecha-
nisms at the outset. 
Several devices can meet this need. 161 One gives the investor working control 
or the power to require dissolution and liquidation in certain circumstances. If an 
155. See, e.g., Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41, 44 (Cal. 1961) (holding that partner's proposed dissolu-
tion would be wrongful if he were "attempting to appropriate to his own use the new prosperity of the 
partnership without adequate compensation to his co-partner"). 
156. See DRAKE, supra note 145, at 180 (suggesting that a buy-sell agreement set a discount from 
the regular price for certain situations). 
157. See Mark A. Medearis&: Michael W Hall, Minority Equity Investments in Connection with Stra-
tegic Alliances, in 5TRUCfURING, NEGOTIATING&: IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLIANCES: 2001, at 93, 106 (Pll 
Corp. L. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. B-1260, 2001) (describing a "rubber band" clause 
providing for return to a party upon dissolution of property that it had contributed to the alliance). 
158. See HARRIGAN, supra note 115, at 98-99 (describing this device). 
159. See LR.C. § 165(a) (2006) (permitting deduction for "any loss sustained"). 
160. See Michael Klausner&: Kate Litvak, What Economists Have Taught Us About Venture Capital 
Contracting, in BRIDGING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCING GAP 54, 57 (Michael J. Whincop ed., 2001) 
(stating that managers may wish to delay termination in order to maintain "salary and other compensa-
tion, social status, and psychic benefits of managing a business"). 
161. See Kaplan &: Stromberg, supra note 142, at 298, 305, 309 (reporting on frequent provision 
for increase in venture capitalists' board representation if company fails to meet stated goals); id. at 291 
("Optional redemption and put provisions also are commonly used to strengthen the liquidation rights 
of the [venture capitalist]'s investment."). 
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investor cannot have this at the outset, it may demand a "voting switch" or "event 
of election" right that allows it to dissolve if the company fails to meet specified 
performance targets. 162 Alternatively, the investor may obtain a "put" entitling it to 
sell its stock back to the company at a stated price in specified circumstances, 163 
or "demand" registration rights that require the company to register the investor's 
shares for a public offering when the investor so desires and stipulated conditions 
are met. 164 
Disputes can also arise over exit opportunities. If an offer is made to buy the 
company, one party may want to take it but the other party vetoes the offer; or 
one party agrees to sell its interest (usually the controlling interest) in response to 
a third-party offer that is not made to the other partner. In the former case a party 
can avoid being "frozen in" by an "unlocking clause," which requires a party that 
vetoes a bid to offer to buy out its partner at the same price it rejected. 165 The lat-
ter plight may be prevented by a "tag-along" or "take-me-along" clause forbidding 
sales to third parties unless all partners are invited to sell on the same terms.166 If 
the company makes a public offering of its stock, an investor may be assured a 
chance to participate in that offering by "piggy back" registration rights.167 
Despite a desire for eventual liquidity, the parties may initially want to restrict 
the sale of shares 168 With respect to the managers, the motive for restrictions is 
obvious; equity ownership increases their stake in the firms success and, thus, 
of their incentive to work for that success. Both the managers and investors may 
wish also to restrict transfers by an investor. Investors participate in control, have 
access to confidential information, and can ask a court to command or forbid the 
company to take certain steps. Managers and investors must trust each other and 
cooperate. They restrict share transfers so as to exclude investors who might upset 
the apple cart because they have a conflicting interest (like a stake in a competitor, 
customer, or supplier), or different investment goals (like a desire for dividends), 
or are simply hard to get along with. 
Many public companies have a simple equity structure: one class of common 
stock. 169 As the foregoing shows, many private companies have several classes of 
common and preferred stock and debt convertible to equity, each with different 
162. See ROBERT j. HAFT, 2 VENTURE CAPITAL AND SMALL BUSINESS F!NANCINGS § 1:14, at 1-12 (1994) 
(describing such provisions). 
163. See Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 142, at 291. 
164. See 2B HAFT, supra note 162, at F8-1 (describing "demand" registration rights). 
165. See DAVIDj. GlADSTONE, VENTURE CAPITAL HANDBOOK 148-49 (1988) (describing such a clause). 
166. See]. Howard Clowes, Equity Structures for Strategic Alliances, in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING, AND 
IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIC ALLlANCES: 2001, at 69, 142-43 (PLI Corp. L Practice Course, Handbook Series 
No. B4-7l56, 1996) (sample clause, here called "right of co-sale"). 
167. See 2B HAFT, supra note 162, at F8-1 (describing "piggyback" registration rights). 
168. See RoBERT CHARLES CLARK, CoRPoRATE LAw 763 (1986) ("As time passes, the personal rela-
tionships among the major participants in a close corporation always change in important ways .... 
Shareholders who look ahead to these possibilities will usually want to restrict the transferability of 
their shares."). 
169. See jEFFREY j. HAAs, CORPORATE fiNANCE IN A NUTSHELL 332 (2004) ("Most corporations typically 
have only one class of common stock outstanding."). 
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rights and restrictions. The firm:S success may depend on whether the lawyers 
create the right capital structure at the outset and revise it wisely as the company 
moves through each stage of development. 
4. The Significance of Regulation 
Gilson notes the importance of regulation and the edge this gives lawyers in 
handling tasks entwined with regulationY0 He finds this does not explain the 
lawyers' role, however, because "business lawyers frequently function in a world 
in which regulation has made few inroads."171 This assertion is questionable. Reg-
ulation is not diminishing now and is unlikely to do so in the future. Expanding 
environmental regulation is probably the biggest new influence on business, 172 
but nondiscrimination and privacy laws and land use regulation are also play-
ing an increasing role. Changes in business are also adding to legal complexity. 
One example is the growing importance of intellectual property in the knowledge 
economy. What was once an obscure field that most lawyers safely ignored is now 
central to much of the economy. Globalization also requires more firms to juggle 
simultaneously laws of several jurisdictions, many of which differ fundamentally 
from our own. 
None of this contradicts Gilson:S call to expand the skills of business lawyers, 
but it does call for a different focus than he suggests. For the M&A specialist 
concentrating primarily on information issues and, occasionally, an eamout, the 
growing importance of regulation is of little relevance. For most business lawyers, 
though, it is central. 
5. Agency Costs and Opportunism 
Because Gilson's specimen is the acquisition, a one-time arm's-length deal, it 
is unsurprising that he sees business lawyers as transaction cost engineers and 
stresses the costs of producing and verifying information. Relational contracts, 
alliances, and internal transactions need a broader concept. These relationships 
entail agency and agency costs-i.e., "the sum of the monitoring and bonding 
costs, plus any residual loss, incurred to prevent shirking by agents."173 "Shirking" 
(or rent-seeking or opportunism) "include[s] any action by a member of a pro-
duction team that diverges from the interests of the team as a whole."174 "Norms 
of cooperation and mutual trust," which are crucial to the success of these rela-
170. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 296-98. 
171. Id. at 247. 
172. Ralph Lindeman, Small Businesses Face Highest Burden of Regulatory Costs, New Study Says, DAILY 
REP. FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), No. 181, at DER-A26 (Sept. 20, 2005). 
173. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 66, at 35-36. See generally id. at 35-38. All relational contracts and alli-
ances entail agency in the economic sense that one party relies on the exercise of discretion by another, 
although they do not always entail agency in the legal sense of one party (the agent) having authority 
to act on behalf of another. 
174. Id. at 36. 
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tionships, "create openings for opportunists ... to abuse them."175 Thus, deter-
ring opportunism is a principal concern of corporate law176 and of lawyers who 
structure these relationshipsY7 
6. Looking Ahead (and Further Ahead) 
The time frame ofM&A specialists generally ends at the closing. Eamouts are an 
exception, but they are relatively uncommon and require only limited planning. 
By contrast, many other areas of business practice require extensive planning for 
future dealings. Again, a relational contract, strategic alliance, or (re)organization 
of a firm requires careful planning to promote cooperation and trust in order to 
maximize gains to all. 
To foster trust a lawyer may include some purely aspirational contract declara-
tions about "the centrality of trust in the relationship" and "that success will de-
pend on continuing cooperation."178 Although not legally enforceable, such terms 
are useful because the people involved in the alliance change over time. Those who 
create the alliance may move on; their successors should understand the intentions 
of the parties when they formed the venture.I 79 Trust and cooperation are also nur-
tured by provisions for frequent meetings and exchanges of information. I so 
Partners begin a venture with certain expectations. In venture financings, for 
example, control and financial rights are allotted on the basis of agreed projec-
tions that usually begin with a business plan prepared by the entrepreneurs. 18I 
Since the enterprise and the projections are created by the entrepreneurs, ven-
ture capitalists often argue that, if the projections are not met, the entrepreneurs 
should surrender some of their control and financial rights to the investors. This 
can be arranged through a "voting switch" or "event of election" clause.I82 
175. Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can't]ll5t Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS in PRACTICE: lAWYERS' ROLES, 
REsPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 42, 44 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000). 
176. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 66, at 27. 
177. See Rasmusen, supra note 143, at 44 ("The purpose of the legal staff is to deter the mher side 
from trying to be sly or dishonest .... "). 
178. jORDAN D. LEWJS, TRUSTED PARTNERS: How COMPANIES BUILD MUTUAL TRUST AND WIN TOGETHER 265 
(1999) (recommending such provisions). 
179. See George G. Triantis, The Effidency of Vague Contract TeT1115: A Respome to the Schwartz-Scott 
Theory ofU.C.C. Article 2, 62 LA. L. REv. 1065, 1072-73 (2002) (stating that "[t]he parties may use a 
vague term to communicate intentions and expectations to each other or even to their own co-workers 
or agents"). 
180. See jorg Sydow, Understanding the Comtitution of Interorganizational Trust, in TRUST WiTHIN AND 
BETWEEN ORGANIZATIONS: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS 38, 48 (Christel Lane&: Reinhard 
Bachmann eds., 1998) (noting that "frequent, repeated and multifaceted contacts among organizations 
and an open exchange of information increase the possibility of trust building"); Gulati, Alliances and 
Networl<S, supra note 91, at 306 (stating that "regular information exchange with the partners" is as-
sociated with success in alliances); Edward H. Lorenz, Neither F1iends nor Strangers: Informal Networl<S 
of Subcontracting in French Jndll5try, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 194, 207 
iDiego Gambetta ed., 1988) (stating that members of business networks invariably "stressed the need 
or personal contact"). 
181. See Bernstein, Silicon Valley Lawyer, supra note 28, at 245 ("The lawyer ... assists the entre-
preneur in developing a business plan .... "). 
182. See supra note 162. 
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Further, additional financing is often contemplated.183 Planning then is more 
complicated. The lawyers must create a structure that is suitable both for the pres-
ent and for the changes that will be needed for later financing. To some extent 
the lawyers can let the parties cross that bridge when they come to it, but some 
advance planning is required. Consider a firm that begins with two parties-the 
managers and one investor. If more money is needed later and the initial investor 
can veto the entry of a new participant, the managers must then either watch the 
firm fail or let the initial investor provide the additional capital on whatever terms 
it dictates. If the initial investor has no veto, however, a new investor could obtain 
rights that drastically dilute the initial investor's financial and control rights. 184 
The lawyers must arrange matters so that no party can block a future financing 
that would enlarge the pie (i.e., increase the value of the firm), and so that no 
future financing will seriously injure any incumbent party. 
There are several ways to tackle this problem. If the initial board of directors 
has neutral directors who hold the balance of power between the managers and 
the investor, the future financing decision will not be self-interested, but it may 
still be unfair to another party or unwise for the firm. The initial investor may 
also obtain at the start anti-dilution clauses that entitle it to receive additional 
stock if a second issue of stock is made at a price lower than the initial investor 
paid. 185 However, such clauses mean that the decline in the stock's value must 
be borne disproportionately (or entirely) by the managers, which they may not 
consider fair. 
Obviously, there is no one right answer to this problem. The minimum need is 
for some arrangement acceptable to all sides. The ideal solution is one that causes 
no friction when future financing is sought. The skill of counsel may determine 
whether the ideal is realized or, at the other extreme, no solution is found and 
the deal collapses. And this is but one of many issues that must be resolved when 
a firm is created. Other issues concern the future possibility of going public, 
such as what happens to the rights of investors that are unsuitable in a public 
company. 
Handling these problems requires distinct skills. Counsel must be able to an-
ticipate future problems and fashion solutions to them. In so doing they must 
decide what issues can be left open until later and which should be resolved at the 
outset, which in turn raises questions of how important various questions are to 
the parties. Thus, counsel needs an understanding of what problems can arise for 
a particular firm as it grows and the special needs of its particular parties. 
183. See Bartlett, supra note 98, at 52 (stating that "a venture capitalist will typically stage its invest-
ment in a start-up company by incrementally investing capital over time"). Joint ventures and other 
alliances also frequently need additional capital after a time, and this need can cause friction between 
the parties. See George W Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fidudary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 Bus. LAw. 
55, 93 (2001) [hereinafter "Dent, Gap Fillers"]. 
184. See Bartlett, supra note 98, at 53-54 (stating that a venture capital investor "typically obtains 
special stockholder voting rights (or 'protective provisions') allowing the investor to veto important 
corporate actions"). 
185. See Bartlett, supra note 98, at 79-80 (describing anti-dilution clauses). 
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7. Conclusion 
The range of enterprise designs is vast and solutions are often complex. Part of 
the complexity is that the solution to one problem often gives birth to another. If 
counsel is skillful, however, the new problem will be smaller than the old, and the 
new problem can also be solved. Although that solution, too, may spawn new dif-
ficulties, eventually problems may be whittled down to acceptable proportions. 186 
C. PRACTICAL SKILLS 
In addition to enterprise design, most business lawyers need a variety of practi-
cal skills that are largely irrelevant to the M&A specialist. Although many of these 
skills are also needed in other fields of legal practice, the demands on business 
lawyers are in many ways distinctive. 
l. Spotting and Solving Problems and Counseling 
Gilson~ M&A specialists may spot a problem of which the clients were unaware-
that is the whole purpose of having lawyers produce and verify information. How-
ever, their clients are sophisticated and have sophisticated advisors in several fields; 
the lawyers enter the lists late in the contest, after most significant issues have been 
resolved. As a result, the scope of the lawyers' work is quite limited. 
In many other matters business lawyers arrive much sooner, not only before 
major issues are settled but often before many of them are identified. Indeed, 
business people often leave the discovery and negotiation of problems to the law-
yers. In deals where parties must cooperate after the closing or anticipate future 
dealings, they cultivate amicability and trust in their direct contacts. To harp on 
differences would sabotage this effort. 167 Thus, "businessmen when bargaining 
often talk only in pleasant glittering generalities, think they have a contract, but 
fail to reach agreement on any of the hard, unpleasant questions until forced to 
do so by a lawyer. "166 
As Gilson says, the form of acquisition agreements is pretty well settled, 189 but 
the structure of many other transactions is highly negotiable. In strategic alli-
ances, for example, the parties may at first be undecided whether to create a joint 
186. A less sanguine view is offered by Robert Bartlett: "[T]he very attempt to manage one form 
of agency problems may itself result in a second, equally troublesome dimension of agency problem 
among other corporate constituents." Bartlett, supra note 98, at 47. 
187. See David Chamy, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commerdal Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 373, 405 
(1990) ("Negotiation may also create or intensify an adversarial atmosphere by raising the specter of 
litigation for transactors who wish to view themselves as friends or partners."). 
188. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminmy Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 
55, 76 (1963). See also HARRIGAN, supra note 115, at 363 (slating that a common reason for the collapse 
of joint venture negotiations is "that partners did not think through their arrangements adequately 
before they reached the altar. The probing questions the lawyers asked exposed these shortfalls in 
partners' agreements, and the venture fell apart."). 
189. Gilson, supra note 1, at 257 (noting "the general contents of the [acquisition agreement] have 
by now become pretty much standardized"). 
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venture, franchise, license, or dealership.190 They may also be unsure what prod-
ucts, territory, and time period to cover. If dealing with advanced technology; they 
may not even be sure what the product is. Even at closing their attitude may be .a 
cheerfully optimistic "let's hope it works." 
Because the parties often duck known sore points and are unaware of lurking 
problems, lawyers play a crucial role in ferreting out difficulties and finding solu-
tions.191 This task is rendered trickier because spotting problems may cause a deal 
to collapse, whereupon the lawyers may be blamed for "queering" the deal. 192 ln 
many cases this accusation is not warranted, but in some it is. Law schools teach 
students adversarial activity (i.e., litigation) and probing analysis to detect errors 
of fact and logic, 193 so problem spotting comes more naturally to lawyers than 
problem solving. "[l]n many cases lawyers are satisfied when they say you can't do 
what you propose to do .... [C]lients expect you to take the next step and solve 
the problems. "194 And, for self-preservation, a lawyer can be expected to behave 
so that, if a deal does collapse, she will not be blamed. 
More generally, to detect and solve problems a lawyer must understand the 
business context in which the client operates. This is something of which many 
lawyers are ignorant-often, it seems, willfully so. The biggest complaint of many 
corporate general counsel about their outside lawyers is their "not understanding 
[the client's] business pressures."195 
190. See Dent, Lawyers and Tmst, mpra note 61, at 67-70 (discussing choice of entity in alliances). 
See also Gulati, Alliances and Networks, supra note 91, at 302 (stating that there is "considerable varia-
tion in the formal structures of alliances"); Glover, supra note 90, at 9 (referring to a lack of standard-
form contracts for joint ventures). 
191. See Thomas Disare, A Lawyer's Education, 7 Mo.]. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 359, 370 (1996) 
("The ability to accumulate relevant facts and to identify actual or possible legal issues which those 
facts raise is also key."). 
192. "The most frequent answer explaining why announced joint ventures never went beyond the 
discussion stage was that ventures were sunk by lawyers." HARRIGAN, supra note 115, at 363. See also 
RoBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF NEGOTIATION FOR lAWYERS 86 (1985) ("[M]any business people view at-
torneys as deal killers."); SMITH, supra note 131, at 136 (referring to the "historical dread" of corporate 
clients who have "just cooked up a whale of a business deal" that "it will take the lawyers three months 
to 'clear' ... and they're bound to sabotage the whole thing anyway"). 
193. See Daniel D. Bradlow & Jay Gary Finkelstein, Training Law Students to Be Intemational1i-ans-
actional Lawyers-Using an Extended Simulation to Educate Law Students About Business 1i·ansactions, 1 
]. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 67, 68 (2007) ("Law schools ... have historically focused on litigation-
based instruction ... .");]. Edwin Dietel, Exceptional Lawyer Leadership: Ti1.1St and 1i1.1stworthiness, LAw 
PRACTICE Q., June 2002, www.abanet.org/lpmlnewsletter/articles/newsarticle0502_p3_front.shtml 
(stating that law students "are trained to question, doubt, to be adversarial, to be independent, to be 
competitive, and to think win-lose. At or near their extremes, each and all of these concepts can and 
often do work at cross purposes to earning, building, and maintaining trusting relationships."). 
194. Friedman, Gordon, Pirie & Whatley, supra note 28, at 563 (quoting a Silicon Valley lawyer). 
See also id. at 562 (stating that in Silicon Valley the lawyer's 'job is to solve problems: to take a prin-
ciple, a task and 'engineer' it legally, showing how it can be done, or be done best. It is not his job to 
say something can't be done, but to show how it can be done." (emphasis in original)); SMITH, supra 
note 131, at 136 (stating that clients want lawyers to "find ... ways to help businesses stay within the 
law and still get their deals done"). 
195. Katheryn Hayes Tucker, What's GC's Biggest Beef with Outside Counsel?, FULTON COUNTY DAILY 
REP., Sept. 14, 2007, http://www.law: com/jsp/ihc!PubArticleFriendlylHC.jsp ?id; 118967 4162049. See 
SMITH, supra note 131, at 173, 249 (referring to the need for lawyers to develop a "closer identifica-
tion" with the client's "corporate goals, corporate interests, corporate culture" and to "understand the 
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2. The Lawyer's Role in Promoting or Questioning Transactions 
Unlike mergers, transactions contemplating long-term interaction require that 
the parties develop trust and cooperation. Clients often feel that lawyers hinder 
this effort. "[M]any businesspeople are more at ease without lawyers in the room, 
more confident about getting things accomplished while preserving the goodwill 
between the parties. They rail at the negative attitudes lawyers exhibit, seeing 
a problem behind every bush, overcompensating to avoid risk, generating con-
flict. "196 As a result, they often exclude lawyers until late in the game. 197 To be 
helpful the lawyer must promote the clients other interests without shattering 
trust and cooperation with the other party. 
One way to preserve trust is to avoid unusual and complex terms. The effects 
of novel terms are hard to predict; business people feel more comfortable with 
customary terms. 198 They also prefer to rely on trust and cooperation rather than 
on contract terms. 199 Proposing novel or complex terms may signal that a party 
intends to "rely on his legal rights" in case of a dispute rather than trying to re-
solve it amicably.200 "[P]arties propose simple contracts ... in order to signal that 
they are trustworthy."201 The need for trust and cooperation should influence the 
[client's] business objectives"). The need to "educate new firms about their operations" is one reason 
for corporate clients to eschew outside lawyers in favor of in-house counsel. Steven L. Schwarcz, To 
Make or to Buy: In-House Lawye1ing and Value Creation, 33 j. CORP. L. 497, 504 (2008) [hereinafter 
"Schwarcz, In-House Lawye1ing"]; see also id. at 514. They consider inside lawyers to have a "better 
understanding of their problems." Id. at 509. Inside lawyers are often preferred for handling matters 
like "preventive law" because they are "closer to the business of the client than outside counsel." SMITH, 
supra note 131, at 221. See supra note 124 and accompanying text for a definition of preventive law. 
196. FREUND, supra note 72, at 186; see Ernst &: Glover, supra note 90, at 6 (stating that lawyers' 
inclinations may clash with the parties' desire to establish a long-term cooperative relationship). 
197. See FREUND, supra note 72, at 186 (" [M]any businesspeople avoid introducing lawyers into the 
early stages of a deal when, in their view, whats needed is nurturing-not disaster scenarios."). It is 
telling that "in-house counsel seem to get involved at earlier stages of transactions than outside coun-
sel, often helping (more than outside counsel could) to actually structure transactions." Schwarcz, 
In-House Lawyering, supra note 195, at 509; see also Abram Chayes &: Antonia H. Chayes, Corporate 
Counsel and the Elite Law Finn, 37 STAN. L. REv. 277, 281 (1985) (noting that "the very existence of a 
properly established inside counsel pushes back the involvement of lawyers to an earlier phase of a 
transaction and shifts the mode from reactive to proactive"). See also Gulati, Familiarity, supra note 68, 
at 95 (quoting one senior business executive as saying "[s]ometimes we give our lawyers only a few 
days to write up the contract, and that too after the project may already have begun"). 
198. See Bernstein, Silicon Valley Lawyer, supra note 28, at 248-50 (stating that using standard 
terms bolsters trust because the parties are familiar with them and their effects). See also id. at 230 
n.107 (stating that the biggest factor affecting trust "is whether the proposal departs from custom"). Of 
course, innovation is proper, even necessary, when the client has new technology or a new problem. 
See infra note 233 and accompanying text. 
199. See Macaulay, supra note 188, at 58 ("Business people often prefer to rely on a man's 
word ... ."). 
200. Lisa Bernstein, Sodal Nonns and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL INTERDISC. L.j. 59, 70-71 
(1993). 
20 l. Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner &: Richard Zeckhauser, The Design and Interpretation of Con-
tracts: Why Complexity Matters, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 91, 117 (2000). See also id. at 115 (noting "trust 
and nonlegal sanctions encourage the formation of simple contracts"); Macaulay; supra note 188, at 64 
("Some businessmen object that in ... a carefully worked out relationship, one gets performance only 
to the letter of the contract ... whereas performing to the spirit of the contract would offer mutual 
expected gains."). 
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'lawyer's demeanor as well as her substantive positions. One veteran practitioner 
says "the attorney on the other side and I see each other as partners facilitating a 
mutually beneficial business arrangement." 202 This is achieved by the "signaling 
of shared assumptions and understandings at the very beginning. Competence, 
benevolence, and integrity [are] important antecedents of trustworthiness." 203 
On occasion, however, clients want a lawyer to play the heavy in a good-cop 
bad-cop game. 204 Although seeking trust and cooperation, clients also realize that 
tough issues must be tackled, so they assign lawyers the dirty work. The business 
people on both sides take the resulting benefits while disowning the lawyers' 
hardball tactics. However, some business people may not know this game. The 
lawyer must navigate cautiously to placate varied sensibilities. Playing the bad cop 
should be easier for outside counsel, and may be one reason for the continuing 
use of outside counsel to handle contentious issues. 
A lawyer who represents a client frequently cares more about pleasing the cli-
ent and less about his own reputation than a lawyer in a one-time representation. 
Even in the former case, though, the lawyer often expects that he will again face 
those with whom he is dealing in the future. Lawyers in a venture capital financ-
ing may deal with the same people repeatedly: Lawyers who create a strategic 
alliance may meet again later to cope with new problems or to revise the venture. 
Lawyers who get a reputation for being unreasonable may find others hesitant to 
deal with them and, thus, with their clients, and that word spreads that clients 
should not hire them. 
Concern for her reputation can affect not only a lawyer's behavior toward third 
parties but also her advice to her client. Again, many deals rely on trust as well as 
contract. If a client violates a partner's trust, the lawyer may fear damage not only 
to the client but also to her own reputation. 205 More generally; the lawyer will seek 
to prove himself not as a one-time hired hit man but as a valuable member of an 
ongoing team. To do so he must understand the company's business plan, strategy; 
and culture, matters of no interest to the M&A specialist. And to understand the 
business a lawyer must ask questions, something many lawyers hesitate to do. 205 
202. LEWis, supra note 178, at 262 (quoting an unnamed lawyer). See also id. at 220 ("Candor is our 
style; bluffing and deception are unacceptable[] .... We will use only logic, not politics or pressure, 
to find the best solutions."). 
203. Sydow, supra note 180, at 38. 
204. See Barondes, supra note 151, at 53 (discussing situations where a client "imput[es] responsi-
bility to its counsel. ... Counsel, by taking responsibility[,] ... can deflect the negative reputation that 
otherwise would accrue to the client .... "). 
205. This would be especially likely in a tight-knit business community, which could comprise 
either a geographic area or an industry. See BernardS. Black & Ronald]. Gilson, Ventul'e Capital and the 
Structure of Capital Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47]. FIN. EcoN. 243, 252-53 (1998) (discuss-
ing reputational constraints on parties in the venture capital industry in Silicon Valley). 
206. See Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational 
Representation, 64 IND. L.j. 479, 505-06 (1989) (noting that "elite law practitioners do not adequately 
and efficiently determine the clients objectives for the representation"). One in-house lawyer com-
plained, "You'd be amazed at how many law firms will make a pitch [for the company:S work] and 
never ask a question about our business." Tucker, supra note 195 (quoting Teri Plummer McClure, 
General Counsel of UPS). 
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A lawyer whose client is a repeat customer will also care about the client's repu-
tation and about his own impact on that reputation. M&A specialists often do not 
worry that aggressive tactics will alienate opposing parties and, since they are one-
time agents, their behavior is not likely to be ascribed to the client anyway. A repeat 
player, though, needs a reputation for being fair, reasonable, trustworthy, and co-
operative, and its regular lawyer will be viewed as one of its general representatives; 
the client cannot disclaim responsibility if its lawyer acts improperly. Because of the 
ongoing relationship, the lawyer will also be more careful to keep her fees reason-
able. These concerns are heightened if the lawyer has only one client; i.e., when the 
lawyer is house counsel. The lawyer's entire career then depends on satisfying that 
one client, which calls for behavior different from that of the M&A specialist. 
3. Cost Consciousness 
Thoroughness is ingrained in the legal profession. New law students learn that 
a good lawyer dots all "i's" and crosses all "t's"; failure to do so courts malpractice 
liability. M&A specialists can be thorough, billing the client for long hours spent 
poring over every detail. Acquisitions have huge sums at stake and armies of 
expensive advisors; excruciating care may be cost-justified, and the lawyers' fees 
are small compared to those of the investment bankers.207 Mistakes can be expen-
sive. A corporate officer (especially of the buyer) who curbs the lawyers could be 
blamed if a major defect is overlooked. Further, if the client is a public company, 
the lawyers' fees are borne by the public shareholders. The self-interest of the of-
ficer, then, is to instruct the lawyers to spare no expense. 
In most other areas of business practice clients are more sensitive to legal fees 208 
Hourly billing is often limited or eliminated altogether because it rewards lawyers 
for "running the meter." 209 Lawyers who spend too much time on matters will 
lose money or lose their clients. "Simply put, clients want 'good enough' legal 
services, and outside lawyers frequently strive to deliver work worthy of an A+ 
207. See j. Peter Williamson, Mergers and Acquisitions, in THE INVESTMENT BANh.1NG HANDBOOK 219, 
245 (j. Peter Williamson ed., 1988) ("Generally, the investment banker's fee in a major M&:A transac-
tion is based on the size of the transaction, often running into the millions of dollars. Lawyers' fees 
have been much lower, although they have risen in recent years."). 
208. See Disare, supra note 191, at 385 ("Clients have become overly conscious that 'the clock is 
running.' Contact with lawyers is generally kept at a minimum to avoid excessive legal bills.''); Debra H. 
Snider, Enough Is just Enough, CoRP. CouNSEL, Oct. 17, 2001, http://www.debrasnider.com/site/files/639/ 
433561175619/242742/Enough_Is_Just_Enough_w-o_bio.pdf (stating that business people believe 
that lawyers engage in "overlawyering" and should pay more attention to cost efficiency and the client's 
"business objectives"). 
209. See Langevoort &: Rasmussen, supra note 109, at 389-93 (showing how hourly billing en-
courages overlawyering). See also julie Kay, Billing Gets Creative in Souring Economy, NAT'L L.j., Nov. 
10, 2008, at 1, 1 ("What has been a slow and steady call by many corporations, in-house coun-
sel and legal think tanks to law fiTITI5 to abandon the billable hour in favor of alternative fee ar-
rangements has turned into a loud drumbeat in the past year .... "); Zusha Elinson, Are Big Finns 
Wanning Up to Alternative Fee Deals?, THE RECORDER, july ll, 2007, www.law.com/jsp!law!LawArticle 
Friendly.jsp?id~ll84058401567 ("With hourly rates continuing to skyrocket at big liTITI5, clients are 
. pushing alternative fees as a way to control costs .... While the billable hour is still the most common 
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on a law school exam. •>2to To succeed, lawyers first need the skill to distinguish 
whats important and cost-effective for the client, and what's not. In negotiations, 
for example, the lawyer must determine whether the cost of negotiating and draft-
ing a provision will exceed the present value of its benefits. 211 Lawyers must also 
explain to the client what work is needed and why. Many clients complain that 
lawyers do not do this well. 212 
The lawyer and client also need a fee structure that works for both. Clients will 
not pay by the hour for a lawyer who quibbles endlessly over trivia. If a lawyer 
works for a fixed fee, unnecessary or inefficient work earns no reward; it just 
wastes her own time. Lawyers may fear fixed fees, though, because the client may 
demand extra service for which the lawyer will not be paid. Clear communica-
tion and cooperation between lawyer and client are needed to reach a mutually 
satisfactory arrangement. 
Some clients ask their lawyers to take part of their fee in stock in the client.213 
Handling this request requires another distinct skill of the lawyer. First, the lawyer 
needs to gauge whether the client will succeed so that its stock will be valuable. 
The law firm must also be sure it can pay its own costs (rent, utilities, compensa-
tion of staff and associates) when it is not being paid in cash. The law firm must 
ascertain the tax consequences of the arrangement and decide how it fits into 
its own profit-sharing agreement. In particular, to what extent (if at all) should 
the risks of stock ownership in a client be shared by firm partners who have not 
served that client? 
Share ownership alters a lawyers relationship with the client. The lawyer's time 
horizons and risk preferences may differ from those of other shareholders, thus 
influencing the lawyers advice about dividends and other payouts, capital struc-
ture, and what projects the firm should undertake. The lawyer then is also a rival 
calculation, fixed fees for larger volumes of work or success-based arrangements ... are getting more 
attention .... ");David Gialanella, The Skinny on Flat Fees, ABA]., July 2008, at 26 (discussing a firm 
that is using flat fees); SMITH, supra note 131, at 233 (referring to the wide variety of billing structures 
used by various corporate clients). See generally RICHARD C. REED, BILLING INNOVATIONS: NEW WIN-WIN 
WAYS TO END HoURLY BILLING (1996); Stephen W Jones&: Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on Traditional 
Billing Practices, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE RocK L. REv. 293 (1998). The lack of this incentive is one reason for 
the growth of in-house counsel. See Schwarcz, In-House Lawyering, supra note 195, at 505-06. 
210. Snider, supra note 208, at 57. 
211. This is the basic tenet of costly contracting theory. See Alan Schwartz&: Joel Watson, The Law 
and Economics of Costly Contracting, 20 ].L. EcoN. &: ORG. 2, 2-6 (2004). 
212. See Zusha Elinson &: Douglas Malan, Corporations Increasingly Unhappy with Their Outside 
Counsel, CoNN. L. TR!s.,july 9, 2007, at 1 (reporting study finding that most corporate clients were not 
satisfied with their outside counsel and that poor communication was a major complaint). 
213. Rules of professional responsibility now permit lawyers in proper circumstances to accept 
stock as payment. MoDEL RULES OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.8(a) (2003) (permitting a lawyer to "enter into a 
business transaction with a client" if "the transaction and terms ... are fair and reasonable," the client 
receives written advice "to seek the advice of independent counsel," and "the client gives informed 
consent, in a writing"). The practice became common. See Christine Hurt, Counselor, Gatekeeper, Share-
holder, Thief: Why Attorneys Who Invest in Their Clients in a Post-Enron World Are "Selling Out," Not "Buy-
ing In," 64 OHIO ST. L.j. 897, 918 (2003) ("In 1999, law firms in Silicon Valley midwifed 173 clients in 
IPOs and owned equity in ninety-nine of those clients."). It is unclear whether the bursting of the 
dot. com bubble or the more recent turmoil in the financial markets has reduced this practice. 
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when other shareholders have or seek separate rights, like the liquidation prefer-
ence and board representation that venture capitalists often have.214 
The competition for a companys legal work often includes both law firms and 
inside counsel. There is a trend toward bringing more legal work in-house. 215 This 
is not surprising; as employees, in-house lawyers are subject to closer control by 
the companys officers, they have a better knowledge of the companys business 
and goals, and their physical presence in the company obviates some travel and 
other costs. At the same time, though, large corporations realize that house coun-
sel is not always the most cost -effective provider, particularly for specialized legal 
work. 216 
4. Business Aspects of Business Law Practice 
It is now commonplace that the practice oflaw has become less a profession and 
more a business.217 Many lawyers could once just do their work as they thought 
best and bill clients for the hours they spent. Nothing more was required to 
achieve prosperity: That has changed. Law firms now compete more for business. 
Clients no longer hire one firm for all their legal work; they retain different firms 
for different matters, and often look for a particular lawyer, not a whole firm. 218 
Lawyers are more mobile. It was once rare for partners to switch firms; now it 
happens every day: As a result, firms can no longer divide income on some stair-
step basis like the partners year of law school graduation.219 A lawyer who brings 
more income to the firm than she is allowed to take out will go elsewhere. Because 
214. See 2 HAFT, supra note 162, § 1.01, at 1-4 (describing conflicting interests when lawyer is 
also a shareholder). 
215. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST lAWYER-fAILING IDEAlS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 284 (1993) 
(stating that "many corporations today do more of their own routine legal work than they did before, 
and increasingly rely on outside firms only for those unusual matters requiring special intellectual or 
other resources that it would be uneconomical for these companies to acquire on their own"); Mary C. 
Daly, The Cultural, Ethical, and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of 
General Counsel, 46 EMORY L.J 1057, 1059 (1997) (reporting that between 1961 and 1982 the num-
ber of in-house lawyers quadrupled, and that from 1980 to 1991 the number rose by 33 percent); 
Rosen, supra note 206, at 488; D. Daniel Sokol, Globalization of Law Firms: A Survey of the Literature 
and a Research Agenda for Further Study, 141ND.j. GLOBAL LEGAL Sruo. 5, 24-25 (2007) (referring to the 
growing "importance of the in-house counsel to the corporation" and the "increasingly large number of 
roles" played by in-house counsel); Niraj Chokshi, Survey: GCs Cutting Back on Outside Fim15, THE 
REcoRDER, june 25, 2008 (on file with The Business Lawyer) (stating that "more chief legal officers are 
planning to decrease their reliance on outside counsel and increase their in-house staffs in the coming 
year"); Smith, Venture Capital, supra note 144, at 227 (stating that between 1990 and 2000 General 
Electric increased the portion of legal work done in-house from 40 percent to 60 percent). 
216. See Michael]. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, 18 
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 423, 450 (1993) (stating that corporations "remain dependent on outside counsel 
for specialized advice and representation in critical high-risk areas"). 
217. See Miller, supra note 64, at 1111-21. Professor Miller concludes that changing economic 
conditions of corporate practice have produced "a far-reaching change in the economic organization 
of the legal profession from a 'club' system to a competitive one." Id. at 1106. 
218. See SMITH, supra note 131, at 255-60·. 
219. See Miller, supra note 64, at 1118 ("The 'Cravath' strategy of lockstep partner compensation 
has given way nearly everywhere to 'performance-based' pay."). 
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clients are more cost conscious and no longer hire a firm to handle all the client's 
legal work, each firm department-indeed, each lawyer-must be treated as a 
"cost center." Those that do not pull their weight must be retooled or removed. 
D. ETHICAL IssuEs 
The range of ethical issues confronting the M&:A specialist is narrow. She must 
be honest and may face questions about shading the truth. Otherwise, her main 
concern is to represent her client zealously, which usually does not pose any seri-
ous quandaries. Deciding whether to enter into a merger and with whom, and 
negotiating the price and other basic terms, often do raise difficult ethical issues, 
but these are usually decided before the M&:A specialist arrives. 
Lawyers in other areas of business practice, though, face a host of ethical is-
sues, often on a daily basis. Sometimes the correct path is unclear, and doing the 
right thing may be costly. In organizing a business the lawyer is often asked to 
represent several parties, and may do so with their consent if she can represent 
them all fairly. 220 Deciding whether the multiple representations can begin and 
continue and balancing the interests of the various clients can pose tough ethical 
questions. In reorganizing a business the interests of various participants in the 
firm may differ. The lawyer is supposed to represent the entity, 221 but the entity 
is a fictitious person. Again, balancing the conflicting interests of the participants 
may be difficult. When the lawyer owns stock in the firm, 222 she must also try not 
to favor her own interests unfairly. 
In strategic alliances the parties often owe each other fiduciary duties223 with 
which the lawyers as well as the business people must comply. House counsel 
are employees as well as legal advisors. As lawyers with a single client, their own 
interests are entwined with the actions of that one client to an extent that outside 
counsel almost never are. This situation may compromise the lawyers indepen-
dence.224It may also sway the lawyers advice about questions like whether to allot 
some legal work to in-house or outside counsel. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and amendments to the rules of professional respon-
sibility have also added to the ethical duties of lawyers.225 The lawyer who learns 
of illegal conduct within a client firm now may not be able to remain silent while 
continuing the representation. She may be obliged to report the illegality to higher 
officers and the board of directors and, if they fail to make appropriate correc-
tions, to resign as counsel and perhaps to notify outsiders. 226 
220. See supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
221. See supra note 93. 
222. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
223. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
224. See supra note 100. 
225. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-204, § 307, 116 Stat. 745, 784 (codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006)) (authorizing SEC to adopt rules requiring corporate attorneys to report 
certain incidents of illegality); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. l.l3(b) (2003) (requiring company 
lawyer to report certain known incidents of illegality). 
226. See supra note 225. 
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In sum, the wide range of activities performed by business lawyers now 
pose far more and more complicated ethical issues than those faced by M&::A 
specialists. 
E. CONCLUSIONS: THE DISTINCTIVE ROLE OF LAWYERS 
The work ofM&::A specialists is narrow, esoteric, and not distinctively "legal." It 
is not surprising, then, that Gilson considered their status tenuous and urged law-
yers to re-create themselves as quasi-corporate finance experts.227 A wider view 
of business law practice suggests quite a different diagnosis. The role of business 
lawyers, especially in enterprise design, is broad. And although much of this work 
can be done legally without admission to the bar, knowledge of the law is so es-
sential to it that it would be foolish to try. 
Changes in business are increasing the need for lawyers' skills.228 Transactions 
like strategic alliances and venture capital financing have proliferated. 229 They 
often require complex planning,230 and enterprise design for these transactions 
is eyolving rapidly. Innovation comes from many sources, but lawyers certainly 
play a key role in the process. As Gilson acknowledged, acquisition agreements 
have become standardized.231 In other areas, however, there is, and probably will 
long continue to be, ample room for lawyers to be creative. For some types of 
transactions, such as angel investments, there are no standardized terms yet. 232 
And creativity is indispensable "where a client comes in with a new technology 
or a new problem and there is no form book to go to and change the dates and 
names."233 
Business lawyers are not retreating into a shrinking domain, but expand-
ing their realm and prestige. In Silicon Valley, the great incubator of new en-
terprises, lawyers now not only pursue a broad practice of business law but 
also engage in matchmaking, helping to draft an entrepreneur's business plan, 
vouching for a client's honesty, and instructing untutored clients about the ven-
227. Gilson, supra note 1, at 305. 
228. See Huszagh &: Huszagh, supra note 114, at 14 7 ("As a result of competition, innovation and 
information handling technologies, the need to execute [transactional] arrangements efficiently and 
effectively has increased, making lawyers critical participants in these transactions."). 
229. See Dent, Gap Fillers, supra note 183, at 62-65 (describing growth of strategic alliances). 
230. See Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Marhet: Lessons from the American Experience, 
55 STAN. L REv. 1067, 1076 (2003) ("The special character of venture capital contracting is shaped 
by the fact that investing in early stage, high technology companies presents [problems of uncertainty, 
information asymmetry, and opportunism] in an extreme form."). 
231. Gilson, supra note 1, at 25 7. 
232. See cf. Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not So) Puzzling Behavior of Angellnvestors, 61 VAND. L REv. 
1405, 1419 n.57, 1424-25 (2008) (stating that the angel investment market is characterized by 
informality). 
233. Friedman, Gordon, Pirie&: Whatley, supra note 28, at 562 (quoting a Silicon Valley lawyer). 
See also Powell, supra note 216, at 428 (discussing lawyers' "development of new legal practices and 
devices ... and even new forms of corporate organization"). By contrast, proposing novel terms may 
be counterproductive when new technology or problems are absent. See supra notes 198-203 and 
accompanying text. 
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ture capital industry's practices and norms.234 This is not to say that business 
lawyers should be complacent. Much business law practice is routine and can 
be mechanized. Business lawyers who lack advanced skills must compete not 
only among themselves for a limited amount of uninteresting work but also 
with paralegals, a growing number of whom are foreigners willing to work for 
low pay 235 
IV IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL EDUCATION 
A. Is THERE A PROBLEM? THE DoG THAT's NOT BARKING 
Gilson and others have discussed legal education for business lawyers. They 
vary in their prescriptions, but all agree there is a crisis. 236 We may demur if, like 
Sherlock Holmes, we note the dog thats not barking.237 If business law training 
were deficient, we would expect employers of new business lawyers to be barking 
loudly to complain. In fact, they are not. Sad to say, their silence may not mean 
that law schools are doing a great job but that employers do not care what stu-
dents learn in law school. Most employers seem to stress two hiring criteria: what 
law school the applicant attended, and what her grades were. 238 They likely do 
not even care whether a student took many business courses, much less about the 
content of any business courses she did take. 
Legal educators could take comfort from this indifference of employers: it sug-
gests we can run our schools however we please without hurting our students' 
career prospects. (Of course, law school applicants, alumni, and employers care 
about a schools prestige, so we compete like crazy for US News & World Report 
rankings, but that has nothing to do with the curriculum.) However, most people 
like to think that what they do is important and not irrelevant to the outside 
world. So consider two possible explanations of employers' indifference about 
234. See Bernstein, Silicon Valley Lawyer, supra note 28, at 245-51; Friedman, Gordon, Pirie & 
Whatley, supra note 28, at 557-66; KarlS. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L REV. 
15, 28 (1995) (stating that ifthe business clients reputation is insufficient, the lawyers reputation may 
be accepted as a substitute); Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers 
and the Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 679, 699-700 (1996) 
(discussing the role of lawyers in educating entrepreneurs who seek venture capital financing); SMITH, 
supra note 131, at 137 (stating that, "if you had a great business idea," some Silicon Valley law firms 
"could help get you the venture bucks to make it happen"). 
235. See Miller, supra note 64, at 1115 ("Non-attorneys are performing tasks previously monopo-
lized by lawyers, and even computers can do some of the work."). 
236. See supra Part LC. 
237. ln Silver Blaze Holmes solves a crime in part by noting that dog that didn't bark. The dog's 
silence at the time of the crime showed that it had been committed by an insider, someone familiar 
to the dog. ARTHUR CONAN DoYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 335, 347 (Double-
day & Co. 1930). 
238. See Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 
STAN. L REV. 367, 458-59 (2004) (reporting that within each geographic region the most powerful 
predictors of earnings were law school grades and school prestige); Ursula Furi-Perry, Do Law Firms 
Love Your Law School?, NAT'LjURIST, Sept. 2007, at 30, 31 (noting that "more than 50 percent of all on-
campus interviews take place at only 25 schools--or l3 percent"). 
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curriculum. First, perhaps the right changes to the business curriculum would 
matter to employers, but the steps taken so far are not the right ones. Second, per-
haps some law schools have made significant improvements but have not verified 
the improvements to employers. I will consider both possibilities. 
B. POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENTS 
Gilson urged a focus on finance and transaction cost economics, not on mun-
dane skills like drafting, negotiation, and familiarity with standard forms of 
agreements.239 Business law curricula have changed,240 but in 2005 Roberta Ro-
mano declared these changes "thoroughly inadequate."241 She would "actively 
encourag[e] students seeking a business law career to enroll in joint degree pro-
grams" which should be "streamlined" so that students could earn a ]D and MBA 
in three rather than four years. 242 There is something to be said for both propos-
als, but they strike me as insufficient and somewhat misguided. First, they deal 
with the upper-class curriculum, but the problem begins in the first year. Most 
first-year law courses-torts, civil procedure, criminal law-deal explicitly with 
litigation. Those that do not-contracts and property--traditionally stress learn-
ing doctrine by reading appellate decisions. Thus they, too, emphasize litigation, 
not transactions. 243 
This is odd since many more lawyers work at negotiating and drafting con-
tracts than at litigating over the doctrinal niceties of consideration, impossibility, 
unconscionability, and the parol evidence rule, which preoccupy most contracts 
courses. Contracts courses should not focus on enterprise design because much 
knowledge of the substantive law of business entities is needed for that. However, 
many contracts courses emphasize sales of goods, so the drafting and negotiation 
of a major sales contract would fit well and also initiate students in skills (includ-
ing spotting and solving problems in transactions) useful in later courses in busi-
ness associations. 
After the first year, earning an MBA can help a prospective business lawyer.244 
Romano is right that this option "is currently not feasible because the student 
239. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
240. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text. 
241. Romano, supra note 52, at 352. 
242. Id. at 353. 
243. See Edward Rubin, Why Law Schools Do Not Teach Contracts and What Socioeconomics Can Do 
About It, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 55, 56 (2004) (noting that in most contracts courses students "never 
read even a single contract" and "are never given any instruction about the way to negotiate a con-
tract"). See also Tina L. Stark, My Fantasy Curriculum and Other Almost Random Points 3-8 (Emory Law 
and Econ. Research Paper No. 08-29, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=ll58506 (recom-
mending a contracts course with greater attention to transactional issues) [hereinafter "Stark, Fantasy 
Curriculum"]. 
244. There does not seem to be any good empirical evidence on the value of theJD-MBA, but some 
anecdotal evidence suggests that it does have some value. A few years ago Columbia's Dual Degree 
Student Association did a survey which found that several law firms reward associates who hold the 
JD-MBA. See http://wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/students!organizations/ddsa!jdmbasur.htm (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2008). 
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must forgo a year of employment and incur an additional year of tuition in the ex-
isting joint degree program framework, a costly impediment to most individuals' 
enrollment." 245 One practical problem with her proposal is that it would cost a law 
school money since it would have to share tuition with the business school. Most 
law school deans and faculties will not accept that. Romano mentions that one 
school (Northwestern) has already done so/46 but that does not mean that many 
schools will follow suit. One program is an experiment that may fail, or may be 
financially feasible only because of gifts. Further, one or a few schools may attract 
some better students than their usual with a novel program. If many schools ape 
them, however, they will not all get that boost. 
More important, reducing the]D-MBA program to three years means the MBA 
comes in lieu of, not in addition to, law courses. Many consider the third year of 
law school superfluous, at least for top students. If so, students would not lose 
much by spending one of their three years in business school. However, it also 
follows then that they would not lose much by ending school altogether and en-
tering practice after two years. If, as Gilson and Romano agree, law schools are not 
well suited to teach skills for business lawyers, 247 eliminating the third year would 
be an improvement on the current program; at least it would save students a lot 
of money. Again, however, it would be opposed by law deans and teachers be-
cause it would cut tuition revenue by one-third and force cancellation of advanced 
courses, which faculty most enjoy teaching. 
I am unpersuaded, though, that the third year of law school is superfluous and 
that the MBA is as valuable as Gilson and Romano believe. In the first two years 
of law school, students take basic courses that they remember throughout their 
careers. Specialized courses taken in the third year may seem less crucial, espe-
cially since most students cannot know what kind of practice they will eventually 
pursue. It does not follow, however, that little would be lost if third-year students 
decamped for business school. Although they may not realize it then or later, in 
the third year students hone general skills of research, writing, and analysis. Ad-
ditional substantive courses also help to connect and integrate the discrete bodies 
of knowledge that they acquired in the first two years. 
Further, few lawyers spend their entire careers practicing exactly what they 
planned to do in law school. Despite the inexorable trend toward specialization, 
flexibility is still essential. Young lawyers often wind up in unexpected fields. Even 
if they do not realize it, they may then profit from a broad legal education. An 
MBA may be helpful, but it is hardly indispensable; few lawyers who enter corpo-
rate law now have one. And, although I have no statistics, I believe it is rare for a 
business lawyer who lacks an MBA to decide that she needs one and to return to 
school to earn it. 
245. Romano, supra note 52, at 353. 
246. Id. The University of Pennsylvania also recently created a three-year JD-MBA program. See 
Press Release, Penn Law, Penn Law and Wharton Create 3-Year JD-MBA Program (Sept. 10, 2008), 
http://www.law. upenn.edu/blogs/news/archives/2008/09/penn_law _and_ wharton_create_3-.html. 
247. See Gilson, supra note l, at 304; Romano, supra note 52, at 352. 
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This does not mean that some specialization in legal education is undesirable; 
the question is whether a year in business school is the right prescription. Law 
students can take a few courses in a business school, or a business course of-
fered by the law school. 248 A longer tour of duty may be not only unnecessary 
but counterproductive. The knowledge of finance, transaction cost economics, 
and accounting that Gilson and Romano extol is only a tiny part of the skills the 
lawyer needs in most areas of business practice. 249 
Gilson questions whether law schools can teach practical skills like drafting 
and negotiation. He says "[l]aw firms and real practitioners, through some form of 
apprenticeship, are likely to do a far better job than any law school for a number 
of reasons."250 However, law school training in these general skills has improved 
greatly since Gilson wrote in 1984. Law schools now give more emphasis to skills 
training.251 Upper-level courses are offered in these subjects; indeed, they are often 
required, and are often taught by specialists in these fields. 252 
It makes no economic sense for small and medium law firms and corporate law 
departments to give systematic skills training. Even large law firms now provide 
little training in these skills.253 One reason is that in law, as in sports, the best 
performers are rarely the best pedagogues. Few top partners want to organize 
or conduct training for associates. Given their high billing rates, that would not 
be a cost-effective use of their time. Trapped between the Scylla of rising associ-
ate salaries and the Charybdis of growing cost consciousness of clients, it seems 
more likely that large firms will reduce rather than expand skills training in the 
future. 254 
Further, although general skills like drafting and negotiation are useful to all 
lawyers, Part III shows that business lawyers need many skills unique to their 
field, especially skills in what I call enterprise design. These are not skills taught 
in business school or by even large law firms. Whatever the shortcomings of law 
248. See Stark, Deal Lawyer, supra note 44, at 232 (describing a two-credit course called Business 
Essentials offered at Fordham Law School). One professor who co-teaches a Deals course with Gilson 
says that the course includes a component that teaches "somewhat simplified versions of some of the 
financial concepts taught in business school." He calls this part of the course "B-School Lite." Fleischer, 
supra note 47, at 495. 
249. See supra Part III. 
250. Gilson, supra note 1, at 304 (footnote omitted). 
251. See, e.g., Scott jaschik, Overhauling Law School's Third Year, INSIDE HIGHER Eo, Mar. 12, 2008, 
http://insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/12/thirdyear (describing plan of Washington and Lee Law 
School to "completely replac[e] all academic courses in the third year of its program with 'experiential' 
courses in which students will perform work equivalent to that done by lawyers"). See also supra notes 
39-4 7 and accompanying text. 
252. See Disare, supra note 191, at 377, and authorities cited therein (noting "clinicians focus on 
such topics as interviewing and counseling, mediation, and fact gathering" (footnotes omitted)). 
253. See Disare, supra note 191, at 360 ("Law firms and corporate clients are no longer willing 
to complete a law school graduates education."); id. at 384 (noting "young associates no longer get 
the same education they used to in law firms[;] that which is not billable does not get done at law 
firms"). 
254. See Bradlow &:Finkelstein, supra note 193, at 70 &:n.5 ("It is expensivefor law firms to provide 
[transactional] training .... Indeed, ... the cost of such training has become nearly prohibitive."). 
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schools in teaching these skills, they seem better suited for it than anyone else. 
Moreover, materials for teaching these skills, which were unknown in 1984, now 
exist. These include materials in mergers and acquisitions (including a casebook 
co-edited by Gilson) and in business planning.255 To facilitate specialization, 
some law schools now offer concentrations in various fields, including business 
organizations. 256 
Some skills common to other areas of the law have distinctive features in busi-
ness law. Negotiation, for example, is ubiquitous in legal practice. However, law-
yers negotiating in litigation rarely need to foster collaboration between the parties 
they represent. Business lawyers often do, and that need should influence their 
demeanor in negotiations. 257 The ethical problems of business lawyers also dif-
fer from those in other areas of practice. For instance, business lawyers are more 
likely than other lawyers to have to deal with representing multiple clients with 
divergent interests or to act after learning of illegal activity within a client firm. 
One gauge of the quality of law schools' skills training may again be the dogs 
that are not barking. Despite the growing demand for JD-MBA graduates, they 
remain a small minority of the associates hired for corporate work even at the top 
law firms. The]D-MBA seems to be a moderately valuable credential, particularly 
for students in the middle of the pack, but unnecessary for top students. 258 
Another dog that's not barking is the practice-oriented literature for business 
lawyers. Treatises, journals and magazines (like The Business Lawyer and Business 
Law Today), and continuing education courses pay some attention to economic 
concepts and to non-technical skills (like negotiation). However, the main em-
phasis is on technical skills (like the drafting of anti-dilution clauses) and di-
gesting and analyzing legal developments. 259 There is little discussion of lofty 
finance theory and no suggestions that business lawyers need an advanced course 
255. See RoNALD j. GILSON & BERNARD S. BlACK, THE LAw AND FINANCE oF CoRPORATE AcQuiSITIONs 
(2d ed. 1995). See also GEVURTZ, BusiNESS PlANNING, supra note 135. 
256. For example, my own law school-Case Western Reserve-offers concentrations in litigation; 
criminal law; health law; international law; law, technology, and the arts; and public law, as well as 
business organizations. See Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Concentration Informa-
tion, http://law.case.edu/concentrations/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2009). 
257. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text. 
258. This is not surprising. Employers care first about the general cognitive skills of associates, not 
about what courses they took. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
259. l reviewed the tables o[ contents of The Business Lawyer for 1997-2007. Although references to 
negotiation and scattered economic insights are common, only one article dealt directly with negotia-
tion skills: James C. Freund, Calling All Deal Lawyers-Try Your Hand at Resolving Disputes, 62 Bus. LAw. 
37 (2006). Ten paid heavy attention to economic issues and analysis: Linda Allen, Meeting Daubert 
Standards in Calculating Damages for Shareholder Class Action Litigation, 62 Bus. LAw. 955 (2007); Rob-
ert A. Fumerton, Market Overreaction and Loss Causation, 62 Bus. LAw. 89 (2006); Henry T. C. Hu & 
Bernard Black, Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms, 
61 Bus. LAw. lOll (2006); Henry T. C. Hu, The New Porifolio Sodety, SEC Mutual Fund Disclosure, and 
the Public Corporation Model, 60 Bus. LAw. 1303 (2005); Jay W Eisenhofer, Gregory C. Jarvis & James 
R. Banko, Securities Fraud, Stock Price Valuation, and Loss Causation: Toward a Corporate Finance-Based 
Theory of Loss Causation, 59 Bus. LAw. 1419 (2004); Christian j. Henrich, Game Theory and Gonsalves: 
A Recommendation for Reforming Stockholder Appraisal Actions, 56 Bus. LAw. 697 (2001); G. Eric Brunstad, 
Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Choice Theory and the Unresolved Doctrines of Classification and Unfair 
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in finance theory, much less an MBA.250 Law school business and skills-training 
courses (including transactional clinics)251 may have more practical value than 
most of the courses taken in an MBA program.252 
It is also unlikely that the benefits now realized by earning an MBA and a three-
year JD would accrue to students earning a joint degree in three years. Even if 
these students still took all the advanced law school business courses (some of 
which are offered only to third-year students), they would still lack the breadth of 
legal education now obtained in a JD program. Employers might fear that these 
students would lack the flexibility to work outside a narrow corporate area if the 
firm needed them to do so. 
Again, it is hard to show directly the utility of the third year of law school; we 
can only speculate. In doing so, it may help to think more broadly about the edu-
cation of all professionals. In most countries law is an undergraduate degree.263 
Before a law graduate can practice independently, she must complete a clerkship 
under an experienced attomey.254 Despite the obvious cost advantages of this 
Discrimination in Business Reorganizations Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 Bus. LAw. 1 (1999); Sanjai Bha-
gat, Dennis C. Carey & Charles Ellison, Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and Management 
Turnover, 54 Bus. LAw. 885 (1999); G. Eric Brunstad, Jr. & Mike Sigal, Competitive Owice The01y and 
the Broader Implications of the Supreme Courts Analysis in Bank of America v. 203 North LaSalle Street 
Partnership, 54 Bus. LAw. 1475 (1999); Steven M.H. Wallman, Competition, Innovation, and Regulation 
in the Securities Marhet5, 53 Bus. LAw. 341 (1997); E. Norman Veasey, An Economic Rationale for judicial 
Decisionmahing in Corporate Law, 53 Bus. LAw. 681 (1997). The vast majority of entries offer surveys 
and analyses of case law and legislation and discussions of planning and drafting problems. 
260. This is a negative assertion and therefore hard to document; one could cite many authorities 
that support the claim, but that would not disprove the existence of authorities that belie the claim. 
Among those that support it are DANIEL LEE & MAn SWARTZ, THE CORPORATE, SECURlTIES, AND M&A 
lAWYER's ]oB: A SuRVIVAL GumE (2007) (a guide for new lawyers, published on conjunction with the 
American Bar Association, that pays almost no attention to sophisticated corporate finance doctrine); 
Dtsare, supra note 191, at 370-72 (a description of what it means to think like a deal lawyer that 
also ignores sophisticated corporate finance doctrine); Stark, Deal Lawyer, Sllpra note 44, at 364-72 
(description of authors development as a business lawyer that also ignores sophisticated corporate 
finance doctrine). 
261. See, e.g., Susan R. jones, Promoting Social and Economic]llStice Through Interdisciplinary Worh in 
Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. j.L & PoL'Y 249, 267--84 (2004) (describing a small business clinic of-
fered at George Washington University Law School); Dina Schlossberg, An Examination of Transactional 
Law Ginics and Interdisciplinary Education, 11 WASH. U. j.L. & PoL'Y 195, 195-96 (2003) (describing 
a small business clinic offered at the University of Pennsylvania Law School). Although transactional 
law clinics offer certain benefits, they are restricted to a limited range of transactions because "[n]o 
client would entrust a multi-million dollar transaction to law students." Fleischer, supra note 47, at 
485--86. 
262. Of course, by earning an MBA a student shows further evidence of strong cognitive skills, and ~!so a commitment to corporate practice that may be lacking in a JD-only graduate who may just be 
ookmg for a high paying job for a couple of years before moving on to something he really wants to 
do. Also, mostjD-MBA students will also have taken the business courses offered in their law school, 
so it may be hard to determine how heavily their employers weighed the MBA alone. 
(" 263. See james E. Moliterno, Exporting American Legal Education, 58]. LEGAL Euuc. 274, 276 (2008) 
In most of the world, legal education is an undergraduate program of study."). 
5 ~64. See James H. Backman, Where Do Extemships Fit? A New Paradigm Is Needed: Marshaling Law 
c ool Resources to Provide an Extemship for Every Student, 56]. LEGAL Eouc. 615, 619 (2008). Gilson 
recommends apprenticeships, although apparently as an addition to rather than a substitute for the 
graduate degree in law. See Gilson, supra note 1, at 304. 
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program over our own, there is little demand to adopt it here. Perhaps this is 
simply a result of coinciding interests of the bar and academia. Academia benefits 
from having future lawyers for seven, rather than four, years of higher schooling. 
The bar benefits from the lower supply of lawyers than there would be if only an 
undergraduate degree were required to enter the guild: a higher supply means 
lower prices. 265 
However, the public may also benefit from our current system. It is intuitively 
plausible that lawyers profit from developing general skills of reasoning and 
analysis (or "critical thinking") and writing as undergraduates before starting law 
school. Even harder to prove, but no less plausible, is that four years of college 
before law school help to develop prudence, or practical wisdom, which has long 
been considered the quintessential quality for lawyers, and which is critical for 
much of the work of business lawyers.266 Likewise, the third year of law school 
may help to cultivate these general qualities (including high ethical standards) 
that are hard to measure but undeniably important. 
Transactional clinics with live clients and workshops (or laboratories) with 
simulated transactions offer clear pedagogical benefits. Their big drawback is 
that they are expensive for the school and time-consuming for instructors who, 
if they are traditional tenure-track faculty, must also teach other courses and 
produce scholarship. I believe that much of the benefit of these courses can be 
achieved with something like the traditional Socratic method in a large class. 
Problem cases can be assigned and students called upon to state how the issues 
therein should be handled. To simulate negotiation, students can be divided into 
groups to represent the different parties in a problem. 267 Skills training in large 
classes is artificial but has lower costs and time demands on staff than small 
clinics. 
In addition to improving individual course offerings in business law, law schools 
should better integrate these courses. Many law students choose their curriculum 
without much thought about their careers. 268 Students who do think about their 
careers often find little guidance in planning their schedules. Most law schools 
offer only a list of courses in various fields, with no advice about which are most 
265. I do not defend the monopolistic practices of the bar. There are two separate issues here. One 
is who should be allowed to practice law. The other is what is the desirable education and training for 
lawyers, particularly business lawyers. I address only the second question. 
266. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
267. See Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42]. LEGAL Eouc. 
241, 249 (1992) (listing the virtues of the problem method); William]. Carney, Teaching Problems in 
Corporate Law: Making It Real, 34 GA. L REv. 823, 828-32 (2000) (same); Cynthia G. Hawkins-Leon, 
The Socratic Method-Problem Method Dichotomy: The Debate Over Teaching Method Continues, 1998 
BYU Eouc. &: Lj. 1, 8-9 (same). See also Stark, Fantasy Curriculum, mpra note 24 3, at 8-9 (advocating 
a "Deal Skills" course that would include many of these features). 
268. This is not necessarily undesirable; there is nothing inherently wrong with the student taking 
courses that she finds the most interesting or that have the best instructors, even if they do not open up 
any particular career path. However, many third-year students start to worry that a lack of academic 
direction may limit their job opportunities or their ability to perform well in practice. 
Business Lawyers as Enterp1ise Architects 325 
useful for particular purposes or in what order they should be taken. Offering a 
concentration in business law is a step forward since the program usually lists 
required and elective courses. 269 
That still falls short of prescribing an integrated plan of study Tax professor 
Erik jensen and I have for many years taught a course in Business Planning each 
spring. Its only prerequisites are Business Associations and Individual Income 
Tax, yet each year we have third-year students who want to take our course with-
out having one of the prerequisites. Some other students, though, have taken 
several business and tax courses. The wide disparities in the prior courses taken 
by different students make it impossible to teach at a level of sophistication ap-
propriate to all of them-what is just right for one group is too advanced for a 
second and too elementary for a third. 
If we required (or at least suggested) a sequence, students would know how to 
proceed and their courses would be more useful to them. For instance, one prob-
lem in teaching advanced business courses is how to treat business and finance. 
All students have taken the basic Business Associations course, but their levels of 
knowledge vary greatly Some have undergraduate majors in business and finance 
and have taken several business and corporate courses in law school; others have 
done neither. To avoid confusing the latter, the instructor must cover concepts 
already familiar to the former. If the advanced courses were sequenced, the dif-
ferences would be smaller and instructors could reduce duplication in coverage 
among the advanced courses. 
Courses in a business law sequence should focus on the role of enterprise 
architect-i.e., on transactions and internal planning-beginning with the basic 
Business Associations course. The basic course should cover both corporations 
and unincorporated entities because choice of entity is often a crucial issue for 
business lawyers. 270 It should treat legal principles in the business context in 
which they arise, including the financial issues that arise in structuring a business 
or transaction. 
This approach discomforts some students who have no background in business 
or economics and who are accustomed to the litigation orientation of most law 
school courses. This is not surprising-learning in a new field is always difficult. 
Uneasy students should know that many principles they learn will be useful even 
if they do not practice in the business area. First, business issues often arise in 
other fields. For example, domestic relations lawyers often handle divorces in 
269. See Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Concentration Information, http:/ /law. 
case.edu/concentrations/ (last visited jan. 17, 2009) (listing required courses and electives for each 
of several concentrations). 
270. Treating both necessitates a course with many credit hours; at the law school where I teach 
the basic course gets five credits. This creates scheduling difficulties but seems unavoidable if the 
subject matt~r is to be handled properly. It is sometimes suggested that there be two introductory 
courses-one for those who want to specialize in business law and one for those who want just the 
basic course. This strikes me as a bad idea because students often change their plans after taking the 
introductory course in a field. 
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which a major marital asset is an interest in a closely held business and a key 
issue is how to value that interest. Further, law firms themselves are businesses. 
An understanding of business principles may be necessary for a lawyer to avoid 
trouble in her own career. 
Would a focus on transactions and planning slight litigation? In general it 
should not. In the business field litigation almost always stems from poor plan-
ning; lawsuits are lessons in what not to do. I often ask students what mistakes led 
to the suit and how matters could have been handled to avoid it. If attention to 
litigation issues does fall somewhat, though, that is acceptable. Litigators usually 
need to bone up on the fine points of law in their suits anyway; they can do this 
after the suit begins. In transactions and planning, however, the lawyer does not 
know what legal doctrine to delve into unless she first spots the relevant issues; 
acquiring the knowledge to be able to do this cannot wait until the transaction 
is under way. The litigator is a soldier in battle while the transactional lawyer is 
a castle architect. The soldier cannot plan much in advance: no plan of battle 
survives the first shot.271 Not so the architect. She can construct the castle (or en-
terprise) any way she likes, but once invaders appear on the horizon it is too late 
to say, "Oops! I forgot to ensure a secure water supply." 
The first problem in planning an advanced curriculum in business is to get 
adequate faculty staffing. Since talented lawyers have better opportunities in prac-
tice in business (including antitrust, tax, financial, and commercial law) than in 
jurisprudence, constitutional law, and many other academic fields, it is harder 
to recruit good teachers and scholars in business fields. Neither offering higher 
pay nor lowering hiring (and tenuring) standards for business faculty alone is an 
attractive solution. As a result, many schools are understaffed in business areas. 
It would be unwise to dragoon a generalist into teaching even the basic Business 
Associations course. It is often said that any professor should be able to teach 
any first-year course, but Business Associations is not a first-year course and it 
requires much specialized knowledge if it is to be taught well. Nonetheless, if law 
schools are to meet the growing demands for skills training, they must somehow 
find good people to teach business courses. 
In addition to the securities regulation and business planning courses that are 
now standard for most law schools, courses should be offered in mergers and ac-
quisitions and in private financing, including venture capital and private debt fi-
nancings. In general, although an MBA or just a theoretical knowledge of financial 
economics is helpful to aspiring business lawyers, the broader skill they need is 
problem solving, especially in relation to the legal problems of business firms. 272 
271. This is an old adage attributed to, inter alia, Napoleon. See joHN C. MuLCHER, THE AMERICAN 
DIRECTORY OF WRITERS GUIDELINES: A CoMPilATION OF [NFORMATION 183 (2005). 
2 72. See james C. Freund, Teaching Problem Solving: New Business Lawyers Need to Know How to Find 
the Deal, Bus. L. TODAY, july-Aug. 1999, at 32. See also supra Part Hl.C; KarlS. Okamoto, Learning and 
Learning-to-Learn: Simulating Corporate Practice in Law School, 45]. LEGAL Eouc. 498, 505 (1995) (argu-
ing that "[sjtarting with theoretical explanations ... is for most people not a good method of learning"; 
theory should be integrated into the handling of realistic problems). 
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C. CERTIFYING THE QUALITY OF OUR PRODUCT 
As suggested earlier, many employers of lawyers do not pay much attention 
to what courses lawyers took in law school. 273 Maybe they do not think it makes 
any difference, but another possibility is that law schools fail to certify the qual-
ity of their product. A hiring partner can see from a students transcript that she 
has taken some advanced business courses, but the hiring partner may not know 
whether the student acquired any knowledge or skills of practical value. Things 
might be different if law schools offered a systematic program in business law. 
Again, some schools have moved in that direction by offering concentrations in 
business organizations and other fields. 274 So far concentrations do not seem to 
improve a students employment prospects much. One reason for this may be 
that a concentration indicates only that a student has taken several courses in the 
field; those courses are not integrated into a structured program with a logical 
sequence. 
Another reason may be that law schools do not adequately certify the quality of 
their product. This may stem in part from the novelty of concentrations. As em-
ployers become familiar with them, concentrations may earn greater respect. But 
to gain that respect, law schools should better explain to employers the benefits 
of concentrations. Consider a hiring partner who needs one or a few associates for 
the corporate department and faces a mountain of resumes. She can winnow out 
students with low grades or from lesser law schools, but that step probably still 
leaves a daunting pile. Her job would be easier if she focused on students with a 
concentration in business law. Better yet, she could have law schools send her re-
sumes that meet criteria she lays down. In addition to criteria like GPA, she could 
limit her search to students with the concentration. 
CONCLUSION 
Ronald Gilson performed a signal service in publishing Value Creation by Busi-
ness Lawyers-he made public the little known work of lawyers who handle large 
mergers and acquisitions after the parties reach agreement in principle until the 
deal closes. Unfortunately, Gilson took this highly specialized practice to repre-
sent the work of all business lawyers. It was not typical then, and is even less so 
now after twenty-five years of change in business activity and in the legal work 
it needs. Mistaking a small niche for the whole also led Gilson to erroneous 
conclusions about the legal education that future business lawyers need. Later 
commentators embellished but did not fundamentally alter Gilson's analysis and 
recommendations. 
This Article offers a broader view of business practice, revealing the wide range of 
work that business lawyers do and the diverse skills that various functions require. 
Based on this broader view, it urges changes in legal education quite different from 
273. See supra note 238 and accompanying text. 
2 7 4. See supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
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those advanced by Gilson and others. The descriptive and prescriptive differences 
are important, and not just to business lawyers, their clients, and law schools. The 
ability of the American economy to innovate is the key to its success. Innovation 
requires the development and deployment of technology and imaginative ideas by 
business firms. Business lawyers play a crucial role in this work. A better understand-
ing of what business lawyers do and, accordingly; of how they should be trained, is 
essential if maximum innovation and economic growth are to be achieved. 
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